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Abstract 
 
This project involves a failure analysis of the internal structural collapse that occurred in 
World Trade Center 5 (WTC 5) due to fire exposure alone on September 11, 2001. It is 
hypothesized that the steel column-tree assembly failed during the heating phase of the 
fire. The results of this research have serious and far-reaching implications, for this 
method of construction is utilized in approximately 20,000 existing buildings and 
continues to be very popular. Catastrophic failure during the heating phase of a fire 
would endanger the lives of firefighters and building occupants undergoing extended 
egress times (e.g., high-rise buildings), or relying upon defend-in-place strategies (e.g., 
hospitals). Computer software was used to reconstruct the fire event and predict the 
structural performance of the assembly when exposed to the fire. Results from a finite 
element, thermal-stress model confirms this hypothesis, for it is concluded that the 
catastrophic, progressive structural collapse occurred approximately 2 hours into the fire 
exposure. 
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1 Executive Summary 
1.1 Introduction 
World Trade Center 5 (WTC 5) was a 9-story building with standard office and retail 
space located in New York City, NY. On September 11, 2001, flaming debris from WTC 
1 ignited fires in WTC 5 which burned unchecked and caused a localized collapse from 
the 8th floor through the 5th floor in the eastern section of the building. More precisely, 
the eastern portion of WTC 5 experienced an internal progressive collapse due to the fire, 
not structural impact. This project focuses on this particular failure.  
 
The scope of this project involves the determination of the temperature history of the 
steel beams of WTC 5 and then using that information to predict the structural behavior 
of the column-tree and shear connection assembly. Finite element analysis software is 
used for this task. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the failure of the 
steel assembly occurred during the heating phase of the fire or when the building cooled 
down. Common knowledge suggests that the failure would have been during the cooling 
phase in which excessive thermal contraction of the members induces large stresses at the 
connections. 
  
The symmetrical nature of the local collapse strongly suggests that the failures were due 
to the uncontrolled fires. Moreover, it is hypothesized that the failure occurred during the 
heating phase of the fire because the columns remained straight and freestanding after the 
collapse. Furthermore, the shear connections were located a significant distance away 
from the columns, thereby weakening their ability to transfer heat energy to a cooler sink 
(i.e., the columns). If the expected failure mechanism had occurred during the cooling 
phase, the columns would most likely have been deformed to some extent due to the 
tensile forces that would have developed in the girders. 
  
Failure of the steel assembly in WTC 5 during the heating phase of the fire would 
represent a clear risk to firefighters attempting to extinguish fires in buildings utilizing 
structural column-tree assemblies (also known as the Gerber beam design). Moreover, 
occupants residing in hospitals or high-rise buildings of this type of construction could be 
at risk due to extended egress times (e.g., high-rise buildings only allow a limited amount 
of people to egress at once via relatively narrow stairways). Firefighters will continue to 
be privy to this type of steel construction because approximately 20,000 existing 
buildings utilize the Gerber beam design and this construction type is still very popular 
today. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the atypical localized failure within WTC 
5. 
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1.2 Evidence Pertaining to the Research 
Forensic evidence is a key component to understanding the internal structural collapse 
that occurred in WTC 5 due to fire alone. Forensic evidence serves as a baseline for the 
research and serves to reinforce specific findings derived from numerical methods. Once 
the WTC site was changed from a rescue to a recovery operation following the events of 
September 11, 2001, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) formed a 
Building Performance Study (BPS) team consisting of many specialists. The BPS team 
surveyed the WTC 5 site and collected photographic evidence, as well as specimen 
samples to make a preliminary performance assessment of the building, as well as 
supplement future study. This photographic evidence was analyzed to form the 
hypothesis that the internal, progressive structural collapse of WTC 5 occurred during the 
heating phase of the fire exposure. Moreover, this forensic evidence could serve to 
validate any conclusions drawn from the research contained in this project. 
  
The structural plans and details of WTC 5 were obtained from the Port Authority of NY 
& NJ. Due to the extensive litigation surrounding the WTC site, the Freedom of 
Information Act was utilized to legally obtain these sensitive documents. These 
construction documents are essential to this project because they describe the size of the 
structural elements and the detailed dimensions of the connections. This information is 
crucial to the development of an accurate model of the structural assembly using the 
finite element software ABAQUS.  
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1.3 Fire Event Reconstruction 
By referencing the 2005 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report on 
WTC 1 and 2, the effective heat of combustion and the peak heat release rate of the fire 
that occurred within WTC 5 were estimated. More precisely, a series of calorimeter tests 
and a full-scale Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) analysis were used to derive appropriate 
values for the effective heat of combustion and the peak heat release rate, respectively. 
Results from the 2005 NIST reports were able to be extrapolated, for WTC 5 had a 
similar office configuration as compared to that for WTC 1 and 2. Lastly, a 1995 NIST 
report involving a survey of office buildings was used to derive an appropriate fuel load 
for WTC 5.  
  
Using the information derived from the NIST reports, heat release rate versus time curves 
for a medium, fast, and ultra-fast growing fire were derived. The growth phase of the fire 
was assumed to follow a time-squared regime. Moreover, the 1994 Eurocode (EC1) 
provided a method to determine the extent of the fire decay phase. Finally, a comparison 
of the fuel load to the fuel burned over time resulted in the final set of heat release rate 
curves.  Using these curves as input, the Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport Model 
(CFAST) from NIST was used to derive temperature history scenarios of the 
reconstructed fire.  
  
CFAST is one of the most versatile and widely used zone models. Moreover, this 
software performs well for fuel-controlled fires, which was the case of the fire in WTC 5 
due to the large impact holes in the roof of the western portion of the building. The 
temperature history scenarios were derived from CFAST and then compared to 
parametric curves in the Eurocode, which are meant to represent real fire exposures. 
There is reasonable agreement between the reconstructed WTC 5 fire and the parametric 
curves. 
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1.4 Finite Element Model Development 
In order to model the shear connection assembly of WTC 5 accurately using ABAQUS, 
the nonlinear, temperature-dependent properties of A36 steel must be known. Using 
experimental data from Harmathy, temperature-dependent stress-strain curves for A36 
steel were derived. These curves for nominal stress and strain were converted to true 
stress and true plastic strain for input into ABAQUS. The following temperature-
dependent thermal properties of A36 steel were also derived from the literature: specific 
heat, conductivity, and the instantaneous coefficient of thermal expansion. 
  
The connection failures as a result of fire exposure in WTC 5 were due to shear rupture 
of the web portion of the beam stems. This type of failure occurs when the bolts bear 
against the weak side (i.e., acting toward the free end of the member) of the bolt holes. 
Moreover, this bearing stress causes shear planes to form in the web steel. Finally, cracks 
along the shear planes cause catastrophic failure of the shear connection. The goal of this 
project is to predict when the shear connections of WTC 5 experienced catastrophic 
failure as described above. In order to accomplish this goal, the time at which cracks 
along the shear planes begin to form must be derived. ABAQUS does not have the 
capabilities to predict the formation of cracks within a deformable body explicitly. 
Therefore, an indirect technique was derived to predict the time at which connection 
failure occurred. 
  
A failure criterion determination model created in ABAQUS includes a single bolt and 
hole. Using the AISC Steel Manual (LRFD), a failure load was derived and applied to 
this model. The plastic shear strain at failure was then derived to serve as the failure 
criterion for shear rupture at a bolt hole. This failure criterion is important, for the stress 
distribution in the vicinity of the bolt hole has limited application at elevated 
temperatures in terms of predicting failure. 
  
ABAQUS was used to create a mechanical model that encompasses the stress behavior of 
the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor (hypothesized as the initial region of 
failure). This model serves as the foundation for the final model: a sequentially-coupled, 
thermal stress analysis of the four structural bays of interest. This model utilizes 
symmetry boundary conditions to capture the behavior of several structural bays. The 
gravity load was derived by referencing the 1970 New York City Building Code and 
accounting for the self-weight of the assembly. A 10% reduction in the live load was 
included to account for the fact that occupants were not in the building during the fire.  
  
The mechanical model was tested at ambient conditions to ensure the results are realistic. 
The behavior of any steel assembly under ambient, service conditions is well understood 
and easily discernable from experience. The maximum deflection of the floor girder was 
found to be generally consistent with structural engineering standards. Thus, the behavior 
of the mechanical model was validated for normal ambient conditions.  
  
ABAQUS was used to create a thermal model that encompasses the heat transfer 
behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of WTC 5 when exposed to 
the reconstructed fire. Results from the thermal model serve as input into the final 
 14 
thermal-stress model. The temperature distribution of the steel assembly in three-
dimensional space and time is integral for understanding of the thermal-stress behavior, 
since steel strength is highly temperature-dependent. Moreover, the geometric complexity 
of the structural assembly makes reliance upon hand calculations impossible if accurate 
results are to be derived. It is assumed that turbulent natural convection is the heating 
mode of the structural assembly via the upper gas layer temperature history derived using 
CFAST. 
  
In order to fully understand the performance of the WTC 5 assembly during its fire 
exposure on September 11, 2001, the thermal model must be combined with the 
mechanical model: the result is a sequentially-coupled, thermal stress model. Since the 
stress behavior depends upon the temperature, but not vice versa (frictional heating is 
negligible), a sequentially-coupled model yields accurate results; a fully-coupled, 
thermal-stress analysis was not required. It was also assumed that the steel insulation 
stays completely attached during the entire fire exposure. The thermal-stress model is 
essentially a copy of the mechanical model with critical changes: temperature-dependent 
properties were used and the nodal temperature history from the thermal model served as 
input.  
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1.5 Finite Element Modeling Results 
ABAQUS was used to create a thermal model that encompasses the heat transfer 
behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of WTC 5 when exposed to 
the reconstructed fire. The temperature distribution of the steel in space and time was 
derived from the analysis. It is hypothesized that the Gerber beam design utilized for 
WTC 5 isolates the shear connections from their heat sinks (i.e., the columns). As a 
result, a shear connection would experience a significant heat build-up during a fire 
exposure. The results of the thermal model support this hypothesis fully. 
  
It was determined that the temperature gradient between the end of the beam stem welded 
to the column and its other end at the shear connection is approximately 450 ºC after one 
hour of fire exposure. Moreover, the interface between the beam stem and column is kept 
relatively cool. Since heat at the shear connection must travel across the entire length of 
the beam stem (4 feet) before it reaches the heat sink, heat builds up quickly in the 
vicinity of the bolt holes. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that the beam stem itself is 
being heated which reduces the thermal flow from the connection. 
 
It is observed that the insulation functions as predicted: it delays the transmission of heat 
to the steel during the fire exposure. Moreover, it can be observed that the top of the 
assembly remains relatively cool due to the heat sink effect of the concrete slab above it. 
Lastly, the average temperature of the steel agrees with estimates from hand calculations. 
  
ABAQUS was used to create a sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model that 
encompasses the global behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of 
WTC 5 when exposed to the reconstructed fire. This model serves as an accurate 
reconstruction of the quasi-dynamic thermal-stress behaviors that occurred and led to 
progressive structural collapse. This model integrates a vast amount of research and is 
capable of representing highly-nonlinear thermal and mechanical behaviors.  
  
The structural assembly is initially at ambient temperature (20 °C) carrying the specified 
gravity loads with minimal deflection. As the compartment heats up in the first hour of 
fire exposure, the steel assembly slowly increases in temperature. As the steel heats up, it 
undergoes thermal expansion which causes the floor girder to elongate significantly and 
close the gap between it and the beam stem. This elongation causes relatively harmless 
compressive stress concentrations to form on the strong side (toward the beam stem span) 
of the bolt holes 
  
As the temperature of the steel assembly increases, its rigidity decreases steadily and the 
floor girder begins to undergo significant deflection. This deflection causes the lower 
flange of the floor girder to contact and penetrate the beam stem web. This phenomenon 
shall be referred to as the formation of a fulcrum point. After 2 hours of fire exposure, the 
loss of rigidity in the steel “outpaces” its thermal expansion and the top bolt of the shear 
connection undergoes a stress reversal and begins to bear against the weak side of the 
bolt hole. 
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The stress reversal described above can be attributed to the fulcrum mechanism which 
has fully formed at this point in time during the fire exposure. The fulcrum mechanism 
fully forms because tensile stresses surrounding the lower flange’s penetration into the 
beam stem web arrests further penetration in this region. According to the failure 
criterion established, the shear connection experiences “runaway” failure at this point in 
time. More precisely, the model shows that the plastic shear strain reaches values that are 
triple and quadruple the failure limit over the course of only minutes. Once the top bolt 
has failed, the failure of the remaining two bolts would happen almost instantaneously; 
this can be referred to as an “un-zipping” effect.  
  
It is observed that the failure identified in the finite element model is very similar to that 
observed in a collected WTC 5 structural specimen that underwent failure. More 
precisely, the angles at which the bolts pried against the bolt holes are similar in the 
model and the specimen. Moreover, photographs of failed beam stems show evidence of 
fulcrum point penetrations. The sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model has estimated 
the time (i.e., 2 hours) in which catastrophic structural collapse occurred within WTC 5.  
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1.6 Conclusions 
The fire that occurred within WTC 5 was estimated using relevant data and computer 
modeling. The official construction documents of WTC 5 were referenced to determine 
the dimensions of the steel assembly accurately. Using this information, finite element 
models were created. It has been determined that WTC 5 experienced a catastrophic, 
progressive structural collapse during the heating phase of its fire exposure. More 
precisely, the thermal-stress model predicts a “runaway” bolt rupture failure at 
approximately 2 hours of exposure to the building fire. 
  
It is not the precise time of failure which is paramount, but the fact that the structure 
failed during the fire’s heating phase, as opposed to its cooling phase, which would have 
been expected based upon current knowledge and experience of structural fire 
performance. In a general sense, this early failure is very surprising, but in view of the 
construction details of WTC 5, this failure is physically reasonable. More precisely, the 
Gerber beam design used for floors 5 through 8 of WTC 5 possesses certain details which 
make it inherently weak in terms of fire endurance. 
  
The Gerber beam design isolates the shear connections from their heat sinks to the rest of 
the “cooler” structure via the columns. The results of the thermal model demonstrate how 
this isolation causes a shear connection to become 450 °C hotter than the interface at the 
column after one hour of fire exposure; this gradient is maintained after two hours. This 
heating phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the shear connection has a relatively-
high surface area to volume ratio, which allows for efficient heating via turbulent 
convection from the hot upper layer gases. Moreover, the beam stem itself was heated by 
the fire exposure which reduces the thermal flow from the shear connection toward the 
column. 
  
The initial structural collapse on the 8th floor of WTC 5 due to fire exposure alone led to 
the progressive collapse down through the 5th floor below it. These collapses were due to 
the kinetic energy of the falling debris from the 8th floor and subsequent floors below it. 
This collapse may have progressed all of the way down to the ground level, if it had not 
been for the moment-type connections utilized for the 4th floor, which has special 
architectural features. The 9th floor of the building experienced a similar fire exposure as 
the 8th floor, but it did not collapse. In fact, forensic evidence demonstrates that the 
beams reached the catenary phase and remained stable. The only difference between the 
structural assembly on the 8th floor and that on the 9th floor is the location of the shear 
connections; on the 9th floor, the connections were made at the columns. 
  
WTC 5 utilized the Gerber beam design which represents a common type of steel 
construction. Since it is possible for people to be inside in a building utilizing the Gerber 
beam design after 2 hours of a fire exposure (the time these analyses show it would take 
for the system to fail), there is cause for concern. WTC 5 experienced progressive 
collapse, so a fire many floors above occupants may still represent a danger if the fire is 
not controlled by the active suppression systems for any number of reasons. The structure 
itself is the last line of defense against fire and must be designed to resist a collapse due 
to a fire event. In terms of structural fire protection engineering, WTC 5 did not represent 
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an engineering failure, but rather a failure to engineer (for fire exposure). The solutions to 
structural fire protection engineering problems do not necessarily need to be elaborate 
(e.g., designing a “fortress”), but rather well-engineered. Whereas structural design for 
seismic and wind considerations is performance-based, structural fire protection is still 
primarily prescriptive and/or proprietary. This fact has the unfortunate effect of 
preventing engineers from fully understanding and designing for building performance 
during fires. 
  
In general, there has been limited research into the fire performance of bolted connections 
in structural assemblies. It is recommended that full-scale experiments be conducted to 
verify the results of this research. More precisely, a typical structural bay from the 8th 
floor of WTC 5 should be reconstructed and exposed to fire. If it is indeed confirmed that 
the Gerber beam design is susceptible to collapse during the heating phase of a fire, more 
research is required to ensure public safety in these types of buildings. In the case of the 
Gerber beam design, certain hypersensitive structural details which contribute to the 
formation of a fulcrum point failure mechanism may be identified. The most apparent 
hypersensitive details include: the geometry of the bolt holes at the shear connection, the 
construction clearance distance between the beam stem and the floor girder at the shear 
connection, and the location of the shear connection itself with respect to its heat sink 
(i.e., the column).  
  
The finite element models created for this project could be further researched and used to 
devise pre-engineered solutions to the building codes. By addressing the influence of the 
hypersensitive structural details identified above, updated methods of using the Gerber 
beam design could be engineered. It may be discovered that using slotted-type bolt holes 
significantly increases the fire endurance of the structural assembly by allowing large 
rotations with limited bearing stresses. If this is the case, then provisions may be made to 
the building code using this pre-engineered solution. Therefore, increased fire endurance 
may be incorporated into routine structural work that involves the Gerber beam design. 
  
It has been mentioned that approximately 20,000 existing steel structures in the U.S. 
utilize the Gerber beam design. Since it has been demonstrated that this type of design 
may be prone to failure during the heating phase of a fire, fire department incident 
commanders should be made aware of this risk. Certain incident commanders may wish 
to survey those buildings which utilize the Gerber beam design in their respective 
districts so that they can make better informed decisions during a fire event. 
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Project Overview 
2.1.1 Background 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) World Trade Center Building 
Performance Study provides preliminary observations of World Trade Center 5 (WTC 5) 
after the events of September 11, 2001. WTC 5 was a 9-story building with standard 
office and retail space (120,000 sq. ft. per floor) located in New York City, NY (see 
Figure 1 below). On September 11, 2001, debris damage from WTC 1 caused localized 
collapses from the roof to the 3rd floor of WTC 5 toward the western portion of the 
building. Furthermore, the ensuing fires that burned unchecked in WTC 5 caused a 
localized collapse from the 8th floor to the 4th floor in the eastern section. More precisely, 
the eastern portion of WTC 5 experienced an internal progressive collapse due to the fire, 
not structural impact. This project focuses on this particular failure.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: World Trade Center 5 (Prior to 9/11/2001) 
 
  
The scope of this project involves the determination of the temperature history of the 
steel beams of WTC 5 and then using that information to predict the structural behavior 
of the column-tree and shear connection assembly. The purpose of this analysis is to 
determine whether the failure of the steel assembly occurred during the heating phase of 
the fire or when the building cooled down.  
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2.1.2 The Structure 
The floors of WTC 5 were constructed of 4 inch-thick lightweight concrete fill on metal 
decking. Floors 5 through 8 utilized a column-tree system (Gerber beam design) at 
interior column lines in which a 4-foot-long beam stem was shop-welded to the column 
on each side, and the floor girder was simply-connected with shear tabs to the beam 
stems (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 below). The 9th floor and the roof utilized a more 
conventional bay system as shown in Figure 4 below. The differences between these two 
structural systems is peculiar since floors 5 through 8 experienced progressive collapse, 
while the 9th and roof floors stayed intact in the eastern portion of the building. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Typical Column-Tree System (Not to Scale) 
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Figure 3: Typical Interior Bay Framing in WTC 5 (Floors 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
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Figure 4: Typical Interior Bay Framing in WTC 5 (Floor 9 and Roof) 
 
   
Generally in a fire the beam and the underside of the concrete slab are heated, causing 
thermal bowing. As the beam deflects downward, it also undergoes thermal expansion, 
causing compressive axial restraint forces to develop in the surrounding structure. In 
time, the yield strength and modulus of elasticity of the steel decreases steadily and the 
deflection increases, alleviating these restraint forces. The beam then becomes a catenary 
and tensile forces develop in the beam to resist the dead load on the structure. As the fire 
reaches its decay stage, the temperature of the compartment decreases and the beam 
undergoes thermal contraction, which increases the tensile forces within the beam and on 
the bolted connections. Therefore, steel beam failure can be expected during the cooling 
phase of a fire if it were to happen. There were instances in WTC 5 which followed this 
expected mechanism: Figure 5 below shows the 9th floor after the fire had burned out. 
The exception is the internal structural collapse under an intact portion of the roof from 
the 8th floor down to through the 5th floor. 
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Figure 5: 9
th
 Floor of WTC 5 After Fire Burnout 
 
2.1.3 Observation of the Damage 
The local collapse of WTC 5 was the first documented case in which a protected steel 
structure had collapsed entirely due to fire. The symmetrical nature of the local collapse 
strongly suggests that the failures were due to the uncontrolled fires. This is supported by 
the observation that the columns in this area remained straight and freestanding (see 
Figure 6 below) and the roof was not penetrated in this region of the building. Therefore, 
impact damage by debris from WTC 1 or WTC 2 can be ruled out. This local collapse 
appeared to have begun at the shear connections where girders were connected to shop-
fabricated beam stems and column assemblies. Figure 7 below provides an aerial view of 
the internal collapse area of WTC 5, which has a footprint of 11,000 square feet. 
 
The fire-induced failure that led to the progressive collapse of WTC 5 was atypical for 
steel buildings in general. As observed on the ninth floor, the steel beams were expected 
to deflect significantly, yet carry the load (see Figure 5 above). It is hypothesized that the 
failure occurred during the heating phase of the fire because the columns remained 
straight and freestanding after the collapse. Furthermore, the shear connections were 
located a significant distance away from the columns, thereby weakening their ability to 
transfer heat energy to a cooler sink (i.e., the columns). If the expected failure mechanism 
had occurred during the cooling phase, the columns most likely would have been 
deformed to some extent due to the tensile forces that would have developed in the 
beams. 
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Figure 6: Internal Collapse Area in WTC 5 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Internal Collapse Area of WTC 5 (Arial View) 
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2.1.4 Importance of this Research 
During the late 20th century, analyses of the fire performance of steel gusset plate 
connections have alerted firefighters to the inherent dangers of fighting a fire in a 
residential occupancy with lightweight wooden roof trusses. During the heating phase of 
a fire, the destruction of the fibers holding the gusset plate to the wooden truss often 
releases causing failure (Brannigan 83). The economy of this type of truss construction is 
apparent, yet the danger it poses to firefighters has been proven. This project has a similar 
life safety objective as those prior analyses of steel shear plate connections for wooden 
roof trusses. Failure of the steel assembly in WTC 5 during the heating phase of the fire 
would represent a clear risk to firefighters attempting to extinguish fires in buildings 
utilizing the Gerber beam design. Moreover, occupants residing in hospitals or high rise 
buildings of this design type may be at risk due to extended egress times (e.g., occupants 
in high-rise buildings often are directed -via a voice communication system- to evacuate 
in phases so that a limited amount of people egress at once). 
 
If the shear connections of WTC 5 failed during the heating phase of the fire, then fire 
department incident commanders must be informed of this hazard associated with this 
type of column-tree assembly (Gerber beam design). Firefighters will continue to be 
privy to this type of construction because approximately 20,000 existing buildings are 
comprised of column-tree assemblies and the Gerber beam design is still very popular 
today. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the early local failure within WTC 5. 
 
2.1.5 Modeling the Fire Incident 
There was a complete burnout of all combustibles above the 5th floor of WTC 5, and the 
sprinkler system did not operate at all due to a drained water supply (see Figure 8 below). 
The computer model CFAST can predict the effect of a specified fire on gas 
temperatures, various gas concentrations, and smoke layer heights within a compartment. 
This software is used to approximate the temperature history of a typical compartment in 
WTC 5.  
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Figure 8: WTC 5 Involved in Fire 
 
2.1.6 Finite Element Modeling  
The finite element software ABAQUS is used to determine the thermal and mechanical 
responses of the column-tree assembly in WTC 5 to the elevated temperature history 
derived from CFAST. ABAQUS is able to model non-linear material properties (e.g., the 
variation of steel’s thermal conductivity with elevated temperatures) and represent large 
deflection theory.  
 
The analyses using ABAQUS are sectioned into two primary steps. First, a thermal 
analysis is conducted to determine the transient temperature distribution of the steel 
assembly in three-dimensional space and time. This information is then incorporated into 
a thermal-stress analysis in which the structural response is analyzed. It is anticipated that 
these analyses will demonstrate whether the local failure of WTC 5 occurred during the 
heating or cooling phase of the fire exposure.  
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2.2 Hypothesized Failure Mode 
Figure 2 above provides a schematic of the column-tree and floor girder assembly 
contained in WTC 5. Figure 6 above shows the observed failure of this assembly. It is 
observed that the columns did not experience any permanent deformation; the steel 
remained elastic. Figure 6 above suggests that the girders did not undergo the typical 
failure mechanism sequence that simply-connected beams usually do when subjected to 
elevated temperatures from fire. It is hypothesized that the girders failed during the 
heating phase of the fire, which would explain why the columns were found to be straight 
and freestanding.  
 
The figures shown below are schematics that present a comparison between the common 
failure mechanism sequence and that which is hypothesized in the case of the local 
collapse of WTC 5. More precisely, the expected failure mechanisms for both a girder 
that is connected directly to the columns and a girder which connects to shop-welded 
beam stems (WTC 5) are analyzed. The girders on the 9th floor of WTC 5 (directly above 
the local collapse area) underwent the common failure mechanism, for their connections 
were made at the columns. 
 
The conditions shown in Figure 10 occur prior to fire exposure, when the girder is under 
normal service conditions. For both cases, the girder resists the distributed loading with 
compressive stress above the centroid of the beam’s cross-section, and tension below it 
(both are relatively equal). 
 
The conditions shown in Figure 11 occur as the fire begins to heat the compartment. In 
both cases, the girder undergoes thermal expansion. This expansion causes compressive 
axial restraint forces to develop which cause the compressive stress block to extend 
below the centroid of the girder cross-section. 
 
The conditions shown in Figure 12 occur as the fire becomes fully-developed. For both 
cases, the yield strength and elastic modulus decrease as a result of the elevated 
temperatures. As the rigidity of the girder decreases, the axial restraint forces are 
alleviated and the girder begins to sag.  
 
The conditions shown in Figure 13 occur during a later stage of the fully-developed fire. 
In the case of the girder connected directly to the columns, the girder becomes a catenary. 
Essentially, the girder becomes a “cable” in which the entire cross-section experiences 
tensile stress. In the case of the column-tree assembly from WTC 5, it is hypothesized 
that failure occurs during the fire prior to the development of this catenary action. More 
precisely, the high-strength steel bolts tear through the webs of the beam stems prior to 
the girder reaching the catenary phase. 
 
The conditions shown in Figure 14 occur during the cooling phase of the fire. Since the 
members are insulated, it takes a significant amount of time after the fire has burned out 
for the steel to begin to cool. In the case of the girder connected directly to the columns, 
the girder eventually undergoes thermal contraction. This thermal contraction causes 
significant axial tensile forces to develop and the columns are usually deformed 
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permanently as a result. It is hypothesized that the column-tree assembly from WTC 5 
never reached this mechanism prior to its failure. The web tear out failure of a collected 
WTC 5 beam stem specimen is shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Recovered Beam Stem Sample from WTC 5 
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Figure 10: Failure Mechanism Comparison (Phase I) 
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Figure 11: Failure Mechanism Comparison (Phase II) 
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Figure 12: Failure Mechanism Comparison (Phase III) 
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Figure 13: Failure Mechanism Comparison (Phase IV) 
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Figure 14: Failure Mechanism Comparison (Phase V) 
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2.3 Gerber Beam Design 
The Gerber beam design method (also known as the cantilever-splice construction 
method), which was extensively used in the construction of WTC 5, was invented in the 
19th Century by Professor Gerber in Germany. Gerber’s design was in response to 
railroad bridge failures caused by uneven support settlements during this time. The 
Gerber beam design locates hinges at inflection points to allow settlement without an 
increase in the maximum bending stress (Schierle). Figure 15 below shows common 
configurations for the Gerber beam design applied to railroad construction. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Common Gerber Beam Design Configurations 
  
Following its application to railroads, structural engineers realized the benefits of 
applying the Gerber beam design to building construction. The primary advantage of this 
application of the Gerber beam design is economy. The structural design of a member in 
a building is most often governed by its allowable deflection under service loads. The 
maximum deflection of a member is a highly-nonlinear function of its span (L) as shown 
in Equation 1 below. 
 
EI
L
384
5 4
max
ϖ
=∆
  (1) 
 
Equation 1 above demonstrates the tremendous influence the span length has upon the 
required size of the steel beam to resist an allowable deflection threshold. The Gerber 
beam design allows structural engineers to use different sized members toward the 
midspan and at the supports which dramatically reduces the amount of steel required to 
carry the loads effectively under service conditions. Compared to simple beam framing, 
the use of the Gerber beam design may result in 15% to 30% savings in steel, on the 
order of $0.15 to $0.30 per square foot of floor area. Larger bays and longer spans tend to 
increase this savings in steel costs (Hemstad 129). Figure 2 and Figure 3 above show the 
use of the Gerber beam design in typical structural bays of WTC 5.  
 
The erection of a structure utilizing the Gerber beam design is no more difficult than 
simple framing. Moreover, the Gerber beam design avoids the complexity and high cost 
of field-connected moment splices needed for continuous beam construction, which is 
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often used to limit beam deflection. Since Gerber beam systems are statically 
determinate, small errors in length of support columns are easily accommodated. The 
most common application of the Gerber beam design is light industrial, warehouse, 
school, and office construction (129, 130-134). 
 
A major disadvantage common to both the Gerber beam design and simple framing 
techniques is the lack of structural redundancy and reserve strength that are inherent in 
continuous framing. The ratio of lengths of the cantilever to the main span is selected by 
designers to optimize the size of the beam required. Reasonably simple equations 
available to the designer yield the optimum cantilever lengths for a given beam layout 
(134).  
 
While more demanding analytically than simple framing techniques, in buildings with 
large bays, the Gerber beam design typically is the most economical system. In large 
buildings with regular repetitive layouts (e.g., WTC 5), this additional design effort is 
often offset by the construction savings realized. Therefore, the Gerber beam design is 
considered by many structural engineers to be viable for many routine building designs 
(137).  
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3 Evidence Pertinent to the Research 
3.1 Analysis of Forensic Evidence 
Forensic evidence is a key component to understanding the internal structural collapse 
that occurred in WTC 5 due to fire alone. Forensic evidence is the baseline of the 
research and serves to reinforce specific findings derived from numerical methods. Once 
the WTC site was changed from a rescue to a recovery operation following the events of 
September 11, 2001, FEMA formed a Building Performance Study (BPS) team 
consisting of specialists in tall building design, steel and connection technology, fire and 
blast engineering, and structural investigation and analysis. The BPS team surveyed the 
WTC 5 site and collected photographic evidence and specimen samples to make a 
preliminary performance assessment of the building, as well as supplement future study. 
This section shall analyze relevant evidence as originally described in Chapter 4 of the 
World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary 
Observations, and Recommendations.  
 
WTC 5 was damaged by impact of flaming debris from WTC 1 and the subsequent fires. 
The impact damage areas in western section of WTC 5 are shown in Figure 16 below. 
Ensuing fires that burned unchecked in the building caused a localized collapse from the 
8th through the 5th floors in the eastern section of the building. Figure 17, Figure 18, 
Figure 19, and Figure 20 below show diagrammatically the collapsed areas of WTC 5 
due to impact, as well as due to fire alone. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Aerial View of WTC 5 Damage
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Figure 17: Approximate Locations of Failed Floor Sections in WTC 5 (Roof and 9
th
 Floor) 
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Figure 18: Approximate Locations of Failed Floor Sections in WTC 5 (8
th
 and 7
th
 Floors) 
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Figure 19: Approximate Locations of Failed Floor Sections in WTC 5 (6
th
 and 5
th
 Floors) 
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Figure 20: Approximate Locations of Failed Floor Sections in WTC 5 (4
th
 and 3
rd
 Floors) 
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Figure 21 and Figure 22 below show the deformed beams on the 9th floor of WTC 5. It is 
observed that the beams reached the catenary phase in which they no longer behave as 
typical beams, but more like tensile cables.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Deformed Beams in WTC 5 (9
th
 Floor) (View 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Deformed Beams in WTC 5 (9
th
 Floor) (View 2) 
 
 42 
 
Figure 24, Figure 25, Figure 26, and Figure 27 below show different perspectives of the 
internal structural collapse from the 8th through the 5th floors of WTC 5. The sole focus of 
the project is this particular collapse, which was due to fire alone. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Localized Structural Collapse of WTC 5 (Perspective 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Localized Structural Collapse of WTC 5 (Perspective 2) 
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Figure 25: Localized Structural Collapse of WTC 5 (Perspective 3)
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Figure 26: Localized Structural Collapse of WTC 5 (Perspective 4) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Localized Structural Collapse of WTC 5 (Perspective 5) 
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Figure 28 below is a photograph of a typical shear connection between a beam stem and a 
floor girder. The upper floors of the building used three bolts at the shear connections; the 
lower floors used four bolts. Figure 29 and Figure 30 below is a shear connection 
specimen and its associated drawing detail, respectively (Figure 31 and Figure 32 show a 
second shear connection specimen and its detail). It is observed that there is a nominal 
gap distance of ½ in. between the beam stem and the floor girder. Figure 33 below is a 
web stem specimen collected from WTC 5. This specimen experienced web rupture from 
what appears to be a moment force. Shear connections of this type are not designed to 
resist moment forces. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Typical Shear Connection in WTC 5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Shear Connection Specimen from WTC 5 (1 of 2) 
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Figure 30: Drawing Detail of Shear Connection Specimen from WTC 5 (1 of 2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Shear Connection Specimen from WTC 5 (2 of 2) 
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Figure 32: Drawing Detail of Shear Connection Specimen from WTC 5 (2 of 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Failed Beam Stem Web Specimen from WTC 5 
 
Figure 33 above is clearly part of a beam stem because Figure 27 above shows a failed 
beam stem still attached to a column, and the observed bolt hole failure appears very 
similar between the collected specimen and the beam stem still intact. 
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Figure 34 below shows the exterior of WTC 5 during its demolition. It is observed that in 
addition to their specified 1-3/8 in. (3-hour), spray-applied insulation, mostly all of the 
building columns were either located behind walls or fully boxed in with wall material 
during their service. This would suggest that mostly all of the columns were fully 
shielded during the fire and probably never reached very high temperatures relative to the 
beams and girders, which were not shielded and had 1-in. (2-hour) insulation. Therefore, 
the columns would have acted as heat sinks for the beams and girders to the rest of the 
“cooler” structure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Exterior View of WTC 5 (Shielded Columns) 
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3.2 Review of the Structural Plans and Details 
The structural plans and details of WTC 5 were obtained from the Port Authority of NY 
& NJ. Due to the extensive litigation surrounding the WTC site, the Freedom of 
Information Act was utilized to legally obtain these sensitive documents. These 
construction documents are essential to this project because they describe the size of the 
structural elements and the detailed dimensions of the connections. This information is 
crucial to the development of an accurate finite element model of the structural assembly 
using ABAQUS.  
 
Figure 35 below is the title block of the structural plans for the 6th, 7th, and 8th floors of 
WTC 5. The initial collapse due solely to fire exposure was on the 8th floor of WTC 5; 
the initial four structural bays to collapse are shown in Figure 36 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Title Block for WTC 5 Structural Plans (6
th
, 7
th
, and 8
th
 Floors) 
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Figure 36: Four Structural Bays that Initially Collapsed Due to Fire (8
th
 Floor) 
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The structural drawings of WTC 5 reference details contained in the Drawing Book NE. 
The Drawing Book NE contains many structural details, ranging from column schedules 
to connection dimensions. The Drawing Book NE specifies that A36 steel is used for 
structural members and A325 steel is used for bolts. Referencing the column schedule, 
the typical column size on the 8th floor in the area of collapse was stated to be W14X103.  
 
According to the Drawing Book NE, the shear connections in WTC 5 are friction-type. 
More precisely, a pretension force of 39 kips was applied to each bolt. Currently, friction-
type connections are implemented to resist stress reversals due to lateral loads, but this 
type of connection was commonly specified for structures built in the 1970s. The 
standard bolt and hole diameter at the shear connections is 7/8 in. and 15/16 in., 
respectively. Figure 37 and Figure 38 below show the elevation and plan views of the 
shear connections in WTC 5 above the 4th floor, respectively. Figure 38 shows that strip 
shims are required between the shear tabs and the web of the floor girder. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Elevation View of the Shear Connections in WTC 5 
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Figure 38: Plan View of the Shear Connections in WTC 5 
 
The girder-to-beam stem connections on the 4th floor are different from those shown in 
Figure 37 above. Figure 39 below shows that these connections were moment-resisting. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Typical Connection on the 4
th
 Floor of WTC 5 
 
 
The Drawing Book NE specifies that the lightweight concrete slab (110 pcf) is supported 
by a 22 gage metal deck. Moreover, shear studs are specified along the lengths of the 
supporting beams. The concrete slab does not contain any bar reinforcement, but rather 
utilizes welded wire fabric to help prevent cracking. The welded wire fabric conforms to 
ASTM A185. The Drawing Book NE also specifies that column stiffeners are not 
required. 
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4 Fire Event Reconstruction 
It is important to estimate the fire exposure which occurred in WTC 5 on September 11, 
2001. This information is required to determine the fire performance of the WTC 5 
structure. 
4.1 Estimation of the Effective Heat of Combustion 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a report in 2005 (by 
Ohlemiller et al.) which describes a series of six fire tests of single office cubicles, the 
dominant combustibles in the WTC 1 building. For each test, the entire assembly was 
placed beneath the hood of a NIST 10 MW calorimeter and the effective heat of 
combustion was derived. Figure 40 and Figure 41 below show the office cubicle testing 
assembly prior to and during fire exposure for one of the six tests conducted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Office Cubicle Testing Assembly 
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Figure 41: Office Cubicle Assembly During Fire Exposure 
 
 
Table 1: Measurements of the Effective Heat of Combustion 
 
Test  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Effective Heat of 
Combustion [MJ/kg] 
17.4 19.8 19.3 16.9 18 18.2 
 
 
Table 1 above presents the effective heat of combustion for each of the six fire tests, 
which are based upon the cone calorimeter readings. The average value is used to 
develop the reconstruction of the fire that occurred in a compartment of WTC 5. This 
assumption is reasonable because WTC 5 had a similar office configuration as WTC 1. 
 
Effective Heat of Combustion = 18.3 MJ/kg (average) 
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4.2 Estimation of the Fuel Load 
In 1995, NIST released a report (by Caro el al.) which describes fuel load surveys of 
office buildings located in Washington, D.C. This report considered fuel load as the ratio 
of the total equivalent weight of the fuel commodities to the floor area of the space. A 
total of six offices were inventoried, three compartment-type designs and three open plan 
workstations. 
 
Two survey strategies were utilized to conduct the fuel load surveys. The first strategy 
targeted offices in the process of being relocated or remodeled. This allowed for a 
simplified weighing process since office contents were packaged in boxes. The second 
strategy involved conducting surveys in offices in operation. In this case, combustibles 
were weighed individually. 
 
Figure 42 below presents the results of the fuel load survey. The 80th percentile fuel load 
is approximately 20 lb. per square foot (98 kg. per square meter). Therefore, the total fuel 
load contained within a 9.14 m. by 9.14 m. compartment of WTC 5 may be estimated as 
follows: 
 
Fuel Load = ( )( )[ ]mm
m
kg
14.914.998 2 


  = 8,187 kg. 
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Figure 42: Frequency Distribution of Fuel Load 
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4.3 Estimation of the Peak Heat Release Rate 
A 2005 NIST report (by McGrattan el al.) presents the results of numerical simulations of 
the fires that occurred in WTC 1. The calculations were performed with the NIST Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 4.0, a computational fluid dynamics model that describes the 
flow of smoke and hot gases from a fire. The thousands of photographs and videotapes 
taken by eyewitnesses from around the exterior of the buildings served as an assessment 
of the fidelity of the fire model. Figure 43 below shows a model of WTC 1 (floors 92 
through 99) that was used to represent the compartmentalization of the building and the 
combustibles contained. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: 8-Floor FDS Model of WTC 1 
 
 
The computer simulations conducted for WTC 1 estimate the peak heat release rate to be 
between 1 GW and 1.5 GW for fires that occurred on multiple floors. The upper bound of 
1.5 GW was considered for this case. Figure 44 below provides evidence that 
approximately one quarter of the floor area on a given story of WTC 1 was involved in 
fire at any given time. More precisely, Figure 44 shows the upper layer temperatures for 
six times during the fire exposure; at each location the temperature peaked at about 1000 
°C. Each floor of WTC 1 was approximately 4,000 square meters in area. Therefore, the 
heat release rate per square meter of floor area can be derived as follows: 
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( ) ( )
2
2
2 1875.0
000,4
4
18
1500
m
MW
floor
mfloorfloors
MW
m
HRR =









=  
 
 
As mentioned, WTC 5 had a similar office configuration as compared to WTC 1. 
Therefore, the results of the rigorous numerical analyses conducted for WTC 1 can be 
extrapolated to derive a peak heat release rate for WTC 5. It is known that a typical 
compartment in WTC 5 was 9.14 m. by 9.14 m. Therefore, an appropriate peak heat 
release rate for the reconstructed fire can be derived as follows: 
 
Peak HRR  = ( )( )( )[ ]≈mm
m
MW 14.914.91875.0 2  16 MW 
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Figure 44: Upper Layer Temperatures of WTC 1, Floor 92 
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4.4 Development of the Temperature History 
The effective heat of combustion of the fuel contained within WTC 5 was estimated to be 
18.3 MJ/kg. Furthermore, the fuel load contained within the WTC 5 compartment of 
interest and the peak heat release rate of the fire was estimated to be 8,187 kg and 16 
MW, respectively. These parameters were derived from two 2005 NIST reports that study 
WTC 1, as well as a 1995 NIST report. Using this information as a starting point, the 
reconstructed fire temperature history was developed to serve as input to the finite 
element model of the structural assembly. 
 
The growth of a fire may be represented using Equation 2 below: 
 
2tQ α=  (2) 
 
Q  is the rate of heat release [kW] 
α  is the fire intensity coefficient [ 2s
kW ] 
 
The SFPE Handbook provides standard values for the fire intensity coefficient, as shown 
below. 
Medium Growing Fire: 20117.0 s
kW=α  
Fast Growing Fire: 20469.0 s
kW=α  
Ultra-fast Growing Fire: 21876.0 s
kW=α  
 
The 1994 Eurocode (EC1) provides a method to determine the decay period of a design 
fire. If the heat release rate is constant during the fully-involved (post-flashover) period 
with a linear decay rate, the implied curve of heat release rate versus time should be such 
that one-third of the fuel load (energy) is consumed during the decay phase of the fire. 
 
The fuel flow rate is defined by Equation 3 below: 
 
ch
f
H
Q
m
∆
=
.
   (3) 
 
chH∆  is the effective heat of combustion  
 
Using Equation 3, the total fuel burned over the course of the fire exposure may be 
calculated. Since the effective heat of combustion, fuel load, peak heat release rate, and 
the fire growth and decay characteristics are known, the medium, fast, and ultra-fast 
growing scenarios of the heat release rate history of the reconstructed fire may be defined 
as shown in Figure 45, Figure 46, and Figure 47, respectively. For each of these cases, 
approximately 8,187 kg of fuel is burned (2,729 kg during the decay phase). 
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HHR vs. Time (Medium Growing Fire)
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Figure 45: Heat Release Versus Time (Medium Growing Fire) 
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HHR vs. Time (Fast Growing Fire)
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Figure 46: Heat Release Versus Time (Fast Growing Fire) 
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HHR vs. Time (Ultra-Fast Growing Fire)
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Figure 47: Heat Release Versus Time (Ultra-fast Growing Fire) 
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The Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport Model (CFAST) from NIST was used to 
derive temperature history scenarios of the reconstructed fire based upon the heat release 
rate curves shown above and the geometry of a typical WTC 5 compartment. NIST has 
also developed the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), which involves the use of 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The FDS software was not used because the 
longest feasible fire duration for a CFD model is about 1 hour, in terms of computational 
time; the reconstructed fire is expected to be about 4 hours. Moreover, FDS cannot be 
readily applied to post-flashover fires because of the excessive turbulence. CFAST can 
handle much longer fire exposure histories, and it provides reasonably accurate results 
except for the very early development of the fire (prior to the formation of two distinct 
gas layers). The effect of the very early fire development on the protected steel is 
negligible, thus the use of CFAST is logical. The fire within WTC 5 was also estimated 
to be fuel-controlled: a condition which CFAST handles very well.  
 
 In typical compartments, post-flashover fires are ventilation controlled. In the case of 
WTC 5, large holes in the roof of the western portion of the building were present during 
the fire exposure which allowed for smoke venting from the eastern portion (see Figure 
48 below). Therefore, a fuel-controlled fire was simulated using CFAST by providing 
five flow vents from the compartment (see Figure 49 and Figure 50 below). The high 
ventilation conditions may provide the fire with an abundance of oxygen, but it also 
serves to vent heat from the upper gas layer from the compartment. Therefore, a fire that 
does not produce a very high peak temperature would be expected. 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Roof Damage to WTC 5 
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Figure 49: WTC 5 Compartment Model in CFAST (Elevation View) 
 
 
 
Figure 50: WTC 5 Compartment Model in CFAST (Isometric View) 
 
 
The temperature histories of the medium, fast, and ultra-fast fire scenarios that were 
derived from CFAST are shown in Figure 51, Figure 52, and Figure 53, respectively. By 
comparing the heat release rate versus time plots from the results of CFAST to those 
manually inputted at the start of the simulation, it was confirmed that all three of the 
design fires are indeed fuel-controlled. More precisely, the heat release rate peaked at 16 
MW for each of the design fires; the ventilation conditions did not affect the combustion 
process. Figure 54 below shows a comparison of the three temperature history scenarios 
of the reconstructed fire to that for the ASTM E-119 furnace test.
 66 
 
 
Figure 51: Temperature History of the Medium Growing Fire Scenario 
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Figure 52: Temperature History of the Fast Growing Fire Scenario 
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Figure 53: Temperature History of the Ultra-Fast Growing Fire Scenario 
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Figure 54: Comparison of the Temperature History Scenarios of the Reconstructed Fire
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The most widely referenced time-temperature curves for real fire exposure are those of 
Magnusson and Thelandersson. These curves are derived from heat balance calculations 
for the burning rate of ventilation controlled fires. Figure 55 below shows the effect of 
varying the fuel load for a constant size of ventilation opening. It can be observed that 
these temperature history curves last about 4 hours and are relatively comparable to those 
derived for the reconstructed fire in WTC 5 (as shown in Figure 54 above). The fire in 
WTC 5 was fuel controlled, as opposed to ventilation controlled, thus the differences 
between the two curves is expected. It can therefore be stated that the reconstructed fire 
of WTC 5 is physically reasonable. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: Time-Temperature Curves for Real Fire Exposure (EC1) 
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5 Finite Element Modeling Development 
5.1 Nonlinear Temperature-Dependent Steel Properties 
In order to model the shear connection assembly of WTC 5 accurately using ABAQUS, 
the nonlinear, temperature-dependent properties of A36 steel were determined. The 
strength of steel is best represented using a stress versus strain graph. At ambient 
temperature, the strength of steel can be divided into three distinct regimes: the elastic 
regime, the creep strain regime, and the strain hardening regime.  
 
During the elastic regime, the stress on a test specimen can be increased up to the steel’s 
inherent yield point without permanent deformation occurring. Once the yield point of 
the steel has been surpassed, the steel begins to undergo permanent deformation 
continuously under constant stress. After a significant amount of strain has occurred, the 
molecular structure of the steel begins to realign and the strain hardening regime begins, 
in which a gain in strength is realized. The strain hardening regime continues until the 
steel specimen completely ruptures. 
 
Harmathy performed A36 steel strength tests at a wide range of elevated temperatures. 
The results of this work are shown in Figure 56 below. As this figure shows, most normal 
construction steels have very well-defined yield strength at normal temperatures, but this 
disappears at elevated temperatures. The 2005 NIST report concerning WTC 1 and 2 
references this data from Harmathy. For added clarity, the results shown in Figure 56 are 
represented in Figure 57 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: Stress-Strain Test Results (Harmathy) 
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The results shown in Figure 57 below can not be directly transferred to the ABAQUS 
model. ABAQUS only interprets steel strength properties represented as true stress and 
true plastic strain. The data points in Figure 57 below represent nominal stress and 
nominal total strain. Equations 4 through 6 were used to convert the data points from 
Figure 57 into true stress and true plastic strain. 
 
 
( )nomnomtrue εσσ += 1  (true stress) (4) 
 
( )nomtrue εε += 1ln  (true strain)     (5) 
 
elastic
true
total
true
pl
true εεε −=  (true plastic strain) (6) 
 
 
Using the stress-strain curve shown in Figure 57 in conjunction with Equations 4 through 
6, the nonlinear, temperature-dependent steel strength properties were accurately 
incorporated into ABAQUS. 
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Figure 57: Nonlinear, Temperature-Dependent A36 Steel Strength Properties
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In addition to the strength properties described above, the temperature-dependent thermal 
properties of A36 steel were also characterized. The density of steel is shown below and 
remains essentially constant with temperature. 
 
37850 m
kg=ρ  (density of steel) 
 
The specific heat of steel is highly temperature-dependent and can be characterized using 
Equations 7 and 8 (Buchanan 176). 
 
 
( ) ( ) 3623 1022.21069.1773.0425 TxTxTC p −− +−+=            (7) CTC oo 60020 ≤≤  
 
( )T
Cp
−
+=
738
13002
666   (8) CTC oo 735600 ≤≤  
 
 
Using Equations 7 and 8, the specific heat can be derived for various steel temperatures 
(see Table 2 below). Table 2 below serves as input to the finite element software. 
 
 
Table 2: Temperature-Dependent Specific Heat of Steel 
 
Steel Temperature [ºC] Specific Heat [J/(kg*K)] 
20 440 
100 488 
200 530 
300 565 
400 606 
500 667 
600 760 
700 1009 
 
 
The conductivity of steel is also highly temperature-dependent and can be characterized 
using Equation 9 (177). 
 
 
Tk 0333.054 −=  (9) CTC oo 80020 ≤≤  
 
 
Using Equation 9, the conductivity can be derived for various steel temperatures (see 
Table 3 below). Table 3 below serves as input to the finite element software. 
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Table 3: Temperature-Dependent Conductivity of Steel 
 
Steel Temperature [ºC] Conductivity [W/(m*K)] 
20 53 
100 51 
200 47 
300 44 
400 41 
500 37 
600 34 
700 31 
 
 
The 2005 NIST report on WTC 1 and WTC 2 referenced Figure 58 below to derive the 
instantaneous coefficient of thermal expansion as a function of the temperature of the 
steel. Table 4 below presents the data in tabular form, which serves as input to the finite 
element software. 
 
 
 
Figure 58: Temperature-Dependent Coefficient of Thermal Expansion 
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Table 4: Temperature-Dependent Coefficient of Thermal Expansion 
 
Steel Temperature [ºC] Expansion Coefficient [1/ ºC] 
20 1.20x10^-5 
100 1.30x10^-5 
200 1.40x10^-5 
300 1.50x10^-5 
400 1.55x10^-5 
500 1.60x10^-5 
600 1.62x10^-5 
700 1.63x10^-5 
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5.2 Failure Criterion for Web Rupture Failure 
The WTC 5 connection failures not influenced by debris impact were due to shear rupture 
of the web portion of the beam stems. Figure 59 below is forensic evidence that 
demonstrates this shear rupture failure. This type of failure occurs when the bolts bear 
against the weak side (i.e., acting toward the free end of the member) of the bolt holes. 
Moreover, this bearing stress causes shear planes to form in the web steel. Finally, cracks 
along the shear planes cause catastrophic failure of the shear connection.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 59: Web Tear Out of a Beam Stem Web from WTC 5 
 
 
The goal of this project is to predict when the shear connections of WTC 5 experienced 
catastrophic failure as described above. In order to accomplish this goal, the time at 
which cracks along the shear planes begin to form must be derived. ABAQUS does not 
have the capabilities to predict the formation of cracks within a deformable body 
explicitly. Therefore, an indirect technique was derived to predict the time at which 
connection failure will occur. 
 
The 3rd edition of the AISC Steel Manual (LRFD) provides an equation for ultimate shear 
strength of bolted connections (Equation 10). This equation yields the maximum tensile 
force at failure due to web tear out (shear rupture) of a bolted connection. Equation 10 
has been determined from extensive experimental research of bolted connections. The 
stress intensity factor (1.2) is an empirical coefficient that accounts for the tensile 
resistance of steel surrounding the bolt hole. In typical design practice, a safety factor of 
0.75 would be multiplied by Equation 10 to derive a conservative limiting load value.  
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uwcfailure FtLR 2.1=   (10) 
 
=cL  clear distance, in the direction of load, between the edge of the hole and the edge of 
the material [in] 
 
=wt  thickness of the web of the beam [in] 
 
=uF  ultimate strength of the material [ksi] 
 
If Equation 10 is used without a safety factor, the load at failure can be derived for a 
simple case. A one-bolt model was created in ABAQUS to resemble to the shear 
connections of WTC 5 in a small-scale form (see Figure 60 below). This simple 
connection has the same clear distance, web thickness, and steel ultimate strength as the 
shear connections in WTC 5. The load required to cause shear rupture failure of the 
simple connection model was calculated as shown below.  
 
( )( )( )( )ksiininR failure 584375.003125.012.1=  
kipsR failure 4.31=  
 
The failure criterion determination model has two distinct parts: a steel section and a 
high-strength (A325) bolt. These two parts are composed of 3D stress, linear, hexahedral, 
reduced-integration (C3D8R) elements. A36 and A325 steels are used for the steel 
section and bolt, respectively. The A36 has strength properties as defined in Section 5.1; 
the yield and ultimate strengths for the A325 steel were also specified. The assembly is 
composed of four instances: three steel sections and a bolt. 12 surfaces were defined for 
use with contact interactions. The analysis is composed of three steps: Contact, 
Pretension, and Load. The Contact and Pretension steps apply 1% and 100% of the 
required bolt pretension force, respectively. Figure 62 shows the application of the 
pretension force to the bolt. The Load step applies 100% of the failure load (31.4 kips) to 
the connection assembly. 
 
Seven contact interactions which are assumed to be frictionless (e.g., contact between the 
steel plates) were specified. This is a reasonable assumption because at failure the bolts 
would be fully in bearing. Furthermore, at elevated temperatures (when failure would 
have occurred), thermal expansion of the bolts would most likely render friction to be 
negligible. However, in the final thermal-stress model, friction will be accounted for in 
order to capture pre-failure behaviors accurately. In terms of its application to the 
thermal-stress model, it is conservative to assume that this failure criterion determination 
model is frictionless, for it will yield the highest possible strain for the given failure load.  
 
The failure criterion determination model has three boundary conditions which include a 
fixed end constraint and two conditions to constrain the steel sections and bolt during the 
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Contact and Pretension steps. A full analysis was performed on a single-processor of a 
Sunfire X4100 machine with a FP rating of 117 and 4 GB of RAM. The memory policy 
of the job run was set to the default (moderate). The job took approximately 3 hours to 
complete. Figure 63 below shows the stress distribution of the shear connection as a 
result of the pretension force in the bolt. Figure 64, Figure 65, and Figure 66 show the 
stress distribution, equivalent strain, and shear stress at failure, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Failure Criterion Determination Model Mesh 
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Figure 61: Failure Load Application 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62: Bolt Pretension Force Application 
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Figure 63: Stress Distribution Caused by Bolt Pretension 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64: Stress Distribution (Failure Load Application) 
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Figure 65: Equivalent Strain Distribution (Failure Load Application) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66: Shear Stress Distribution (Failure Load Application) 
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The stress distribution in the vicinity of the bolt hole is not helpful in the determination of 
failure of the steel at elevated temperatures. As steel heats up, its strength and rigidity are 
constantly changing in three-dimensional space and time. Under constant loading, steel at 
a higher temperature is expected to have lower stresses, yet higher deformation. This is 
because steel, as it weakens under the influence of elevated temperatures, also softens: it 
does not need as much stress to deform permanently. Therefore, it is not feasible to use 
the stress distribution as the criterion for failure, for it would require constant iteration in 
space and time. 
 
It is the opinion of various structural engineering professionals at Simpson Gumpertz & 
Heger Inc. (SGH) that the plastic shear strain in the vicinity of the bolt hole is the best 
indicator of shear rupture failure at elevated temperatures. Strain can be assessed 
consistently at elevated temperatures, and forensic evidence suggests that shear was the 
mode of failure in WTC 5.  
 
Shear strain is the deformation of a solid body in which a plane in the body is displaced 
parallel to itself relative to parallel planes in the body. Quantitatively, shear strain is the 
displacement of any plane relative to a second plane divided by the perpendicular 
distance between the planes. Therefore, by applying the failure load, the shear strain at 
failure can be derived and used as the main criterion for catastrophic shear rupture failure 
in the final thermal-stress model of WTC 5. 
 
The shear strain of the steel in the vicinity of the bolt hole was observed under the failure 
loading (see Figure 67 below). Furthermore, a mesh refinement analysis was conducted 
in order to ensure that the result is mesh-independent. Table 5 below summarizes the 
mesh refinement analysis and shows that the failure criterion for the WTC 5 thermal-
stress model is a shear strain of approximately 0.16 (or 16%) at the weak side of a bolt 
hole. 
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Figure 67: Shear Strain Distribution (Failure Load Application) 
 
 
 
Table 5: Mesh Refinement Analysis (Failure Criterion Model) 
 
Number of Hexahedral Mesh Elements Maximum Shear Strain (PE12) 
5,146 0.093 
8,626 0.126 
15,748 0.145 
21,700 0.156 
44,140 0.156 
 
 
156.012 =failurePE  
 
 85 
5.3 Development of the Mechanical Model 
ABAQUS was used to create a mechanical model that encompasses the stress behavior of 
the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor (initial region of collapse). Unlike the 
thermal model (see Section 5.4 below), the floor beams are not included because their 
stress behavior is not a concern for this project; they are required in the thermal model to 
account for their heat transfer influence on the floor girders. Moreover, the modeling of 
connections between the floor beams and the floor girders is not in the scope of this 
project. The mechanical model shall serve as the foundation for the final model: a 
sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress analysis of the four structural bays of interest.  
 
The mechanical model consists of 10 separate parts in ABAQUS. Some of these parts are 
referenced multiple times as assembly instances. Each part utilizes hexahedral, 
structured, linear, 3D stress elements for its meshing. The fine mesh parts use reduced 
integration elements (C3D8R) and the intermediate and coarse mesh parts use 
incompatible mode elements (C3D8I). The incompatible modes elements prevent “hour-
glassing” (i.e., added stiffness due to bending effects). If incompatible mode elements are 
not used, the software will enforce hour-glassing controls, which detract energy from 
realistic plasticity of the material under stress. Table 6 below summarizes the number of 
elements used to mesh each part. The regions of most interest are in the vicinity of the 
bolt holes; these areas utilize the finest mesh in the model in order to derive very accurate 
results in this region.  
 
 
Table 6: Number of Elements Used for Each Model Part (Meshing) 
 
Model Part Number of Elements 
Beam Stem (Fine Mesh Section) 16,626 
Beam Stem (Intermediate Mesh Section) 198 
Beam Stem (Coarse Mesh Section) 244 
Bolt 964 
Column 304 
Shear Tab 2,688 
Steel Shim 2,184 
Floor Girder (Fine Mesh Section) 14,706 
Floor Girder (Intermediate Mesh Section) 168 
Floor Girder (Coarse Mesh Section) 800 
Total: 38,882 
 
 
The mechanical model contains two types of steel: A36 and A325. The A36 steel is 
assigned to every part except the high-strength bolts, which is composed of A325 steel. 
Forensic evidence proves that the bolts themselves did not fail, but rather the beam stem 
web, which is composed of A36 steel. Therefore, only the A36 steel was assigned the 
temperature-dependent strength properties as described in Section 5.1. The density of 
both types of steel is 7850 [kg/(m^3)] and their Poisson’s ratio is 0.32. The A325 steel 
has a modulus of elasticity of 29,000 ksi and yield strength of 325 ksi.  
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The mechanical model is composed of 17 assembly instances and 52 defined surfaces. 
According to the specifications of WTC 5, the bolts were installed with 39 kips of 
pretension. It should be noted that North American practice prior to 1985 required all 
high-strength bolts to provide pretension, regardless of whether it was needed.  
 
The analysis of the model is divided into three steps: Contact, Pretension, and Load. The 
Contact step applies 1% of the bolt pretension load and the Pretension applies 100% of 
the pretension load. The Load step applies the gravity load to the top of the structural 
assembly. For each step, the Full Newton (Direct) solution technique is utilized. 
 
The gravity load was derived by referencing the 1970 New York City Building Code and 
accounting for the self-weight of the assembly (including the concrete slab which is not 
explicitly modeled). The self-weight of the assembly is as follows: 4 in. thick lightweight 
concrete slab: 38.3 psf; W18X50 girder: 50 plf. The building code specifies the live loads 
as follows: office load: 50 psf; partition load: 15 psf. No safety factors were used in the 
calculations to account for the fact that the live load during a fire situation is lower than 
when the structure is in service. More precisely, the live load from occupants is not 
present during a fire, but all other office materials (e.g., desks) remain in place. The 
Eurocode specifies a 10% reduction in live load from that calculated for design. The 
tributary area of the beam stem and floor girder span is shown in Figure 68 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 68: Tributary Area of the Beam Stem/Girder Span
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The total resultant load acting on the tributary area is calculated as follows: 
 
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] lbsftplfftpsfpsfpsfP 9447030509003.381550 2 =+++=  
 
The load calculated above would translate into a distributed load across the span of the 
beam stems and floor girder of about 3 kips per foot, which is reasonable. The total 
surface area of the tops of the beam stems and the floor girder may be calculated as 
follows: 
 
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] 226525.72647482 inininininA =+=  
 
Therefore, the pressure load that should be specified in the software is as follows: 
 
Service Load (Pressure) psi
in
lbs 6.35
2652
94470
2 ==  (245453 Pa) 
 
The mechanical model relies upon 35 contact interactions to reconstruct the behavior of 
the assembly under loading. Hard contact is used with automatic adjustment for 
overclosures (i.e., unrealistic penetration of surfaces). Moreover, automatic stabilization 
via viscous damping is set during the Contact step for every interaction involving contact 
within each of the bolt holes. Static-kinetic exponential decay friction is specified 
(tangential behavior) for each of the contact interactions. The coefficients of friction were 
specified as follows: static coefficient: 0.15; kinetic coefficient: 0.08; and decay 
coefficient: 0.1. These values are typical for untreated steel at the interface between bolts 
and the clamped surface. The exact values of the friction coefficients are not critical for 
this model because the shear connections of WTC 5 were most likely in bearing at the 
time the bolts were tightened due to the dead load of the assembly. Moreover, once the 
bolts have slipped due to thermal expansion prior to failure, the frictional resistance 
becomes negligible.  
 
Seven constraints using the Tie feature are used in the model to fuse various instances 
together. For example, a constraint was used to represent the full-penetration shop weld 
connecting the beam stem to the column. As mentioned, a pretension force of 39 kips is 
applied to each of the six bolts in the model. The model utilizes 8 boundary conditions to 
achieve realistic behavior. The floor girders are prevented from undergoing lateral 
torsional buckling because the WTC 5 assembly included shear studs that prevented this 
failure mode (plus the floor beams added to the buckling resistance).  
 
Symmetry conditions were specified at the symmetry lines of the column and floor girder 
to capture multi-bay behavior in the model. The column is assumed to be pin-ended; 
applicable boundary conditions were used. Lastly, the floor girder, shear tabs, and bolts 
were constrained during the Contact and Pretension steps to simulate stability during its 
construction.  
 
A single predefined field that encompasses the entire assembly was used to specify the 
initial temperature of the steel. The mechanical model was tested at ambient conditions to 
 88 
ensure the model behaves realistically. The behavior of any steel assembly under 
ambient, service conditions is well understood and easily discernable from experience. A 
full analysis was performed on a single-processor of a Sunfire X4100 machine with a FP 
rating of 117 and 4 GB of RAM. The memory policy of the job run was set to the default 
(moderate). The job took approximately 7 hours to complete.  
 
Figure 69 below shows a contour representation of the deflection of the floor girder under 
the gravity loading. The maximum deflection is 0.87 in., which makes physical sense. 
The deflection of a beam is typically the governing factor in a common structural design. 
The structural engineer usually selects a beam size that limits the maximum deflection to 
(1/360) of its span. If the floor girder can be assumed to be pin-ended at the beam stem 
connections, then the maximum allowable deflection according to structural engineering 
standards is 22 ft. (264 in.) divided by 360, or 0.73 in. It makes sense that the software 
predicts a slightly larger deflection since the bolts were not positioned at the bottom of 
the bolt holes at the start of the analysis. In other words, the gravity loading caused the 
bolts (and thus the floor girder) to translate (rigid body motion) downward slightly.  
 
Figure 70 and Figure 71 below show the stress distribution in the vicinity of the shear 
connection. The upper limit (red) of the contour plot was set to the ultimate strength of 
the A36 steel (58 ksi). Figure 72 below shows a plot of the equivalent strain; no 
permanent deformation is observed. This makes physical sense, for permanent 
deformation would not be expected under ambient conditions. It can be concluded that 
the mechanical model represents the structural behavior of the assembly accurately under 
ambient conditions. Therefore, this model will serve as a proper foundation for the 
sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model. 
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Figure 69: Deflection of the Floor Girder 
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Figure 70: Von Mises Stress Distribution (Shear Tabs Included) 
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Figure 71: Von Mises Stress Distribution (Shear Tabs Excluded) 
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Figure 72: Equivalent Strain Distribution (No Permanent Deformation Observed)
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5.4 Development of the Thermal Model 
ABAQUS was used to create a thermal model that encompasses the heat transfer 
behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of WTC 5 when exposed to 
the reconstructed fire. Results from this model shall serve as input into the final model: a 
sequentially-coupled, thermal stress analysis of the four structural bays of interest. The 
temperature distribution of the steel assembly in three-dimensional space and time is 
integral for understanding of the thermal-stress behavior, since steel strength is highly 
temperature-dependent. Moreover, the geometric complexity of the structural assembly 
makes reliance upon hand calculations impossible if accurate results are to be derived. 
 
The thermal model consists of 20 separate parts in ABAQUS. Some of these parts are 
referenced multiple times as assembly instances. Each part utilizes hexahedral, 
structured, linear, heat transfer elements for its meshing (DCC3D8: an 8-node 
convection/diffusion brick). The exception to this convention is the bolt part, which uses 
a sweep-type meshing scheme (the rest of the mesh properties are the same as described 
above). Table 7 below summarizes the number of elements used to mesh each part. The 
areas of most interest are in the vicinity of the bolt holes; these areas utilized the finest 
mesh in the model in order to derive very accurate results.  
 
 
Table 7: Number of Elements Used for Each Model Part (Meshing) 
 
Model Part Number of Elements 
Beam Stem (Fine Mesh Section) 16,626 
Beam Stem (Intermediate Mesh Section) 198 
Beam Stem (Coarse Mesh Section) 244 
Bolt 964 
Column 304 
Concrete Slab 3,867 
Floor Beam (Full Geometry) 912 
Floor Beam (Half Geometry) 760 
Shear Tab 2,688 
Steel Shim 2,184 
Floor Girder (Fine Mesh Section) 14,706 
Floor Girder (Intermediate Mesh Section) 168 
Floor Girder (Fine Mesh Section) 800 
Beam Stem Insulation 22,332 
Floor Beam Insulation (Full Geometry) 7,600 
Floor Beam Insulation (Half Geometry) 4.560 
Floor Girder Insulation 14,360 
Shear Tab Insulation 710 
Total: 93,983 
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The thermal model contains four types of material: A36 steel; A325 steel; mineral fiber, 
spray-applied insulation (also known as “fireproofing”); and lightweight concrete. The 
A36 and A325 steels have temperature-dependent thermal properties. It was assumed that 
the lightweight concrete and insulation have thermal properties that are a constant 
function of temperature. This is a reasonable assumption because the change in thermal 
properties of insulation and concrete is negligible in comparison to that of steel. 
Moreover, the thermal-stress behavior of these materials is not a concern for this 
research. The thermal properties defined in the model for the insulation and lightweight 
concrete are summarized in Table 8 below. The temperature-dependent thermal 
properties of steel (same for A36 and A325 types) are discussed at length in Section 5.1.  
 
 
Table 8: Thermal Properties of Insulation and Concrete 
 
Thermal Property Mineral Fiber Insulation Lightweight Concrete 
Conductivity 0.12 [W/(m*K)] 0.80 [W/(m*K)] 
Density 350 [kg/(m^3)] 1,534 [kg/(m^3)] 
Specific Heat 1,200 [J/(Kg*K)] 840 [J/(Kg*K)] 
 
 
The thermal model is composed of 42 assembly instances. Figure 73 and Figure 74 below 
are screenshots of the thermal model assembly. There are also 96 defined surfaces for use 
with interaction properties. The beam stems, floor girder, and floor beams are protected 
by “2-hour” insulation that is 1-in. thick. During the fire exposure in WTC 5, the columns 
were shielded behind walls and were also protected by “3-hour” insulation that is 1-3/8 
in. thick (see Figure 34 above). It is assumed that the columns were not significantly 
heated by the fire and acted as heat sinks for the structural assembly which resides 
directly above the fire. The thermal model consists of a single transient thermal analysis 
step with a duration lasting 28,000 seconds (about 8 hours). The Thermal step is 
segmented into 80-second increments and uses the Full Newton (Direct) solution 
technique. 
 
The thermal model relies upon 59 defined interactions to reconstruct the thermal behavior 
that occurred on the 8th floor of WTC 5 during its fire exposure. These interactions 
consist of 56 contact definitions, 2 natural convection definitions, and 1 radiation 
specification. The contact definitions are used to simulate the heat transfer between the 
various instances contained in the global model. It is assumed that perfect contact is 
achieved between the insulation and the steel parts. Therefore, any microscopic air gaps 
at the contact interfaces are neglected in this analysis.  
 
It is assumed that turbulent natural convection is the heating mode of the structural 
assembly. Moreover, the convection heat transfer coefficient is specified as 20 
[W/(m^2*K)] and the sink temperature amplitude is derived from the CFAST results. 
More precisely, the upper layer gas temperature history derived from the reconstructed 
fire is specified to heat the structural assembly over the course of 4 hours (the following 4 
hours represent the time after burnout of the 8th floor compartment). Radiation of the 
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heated structure to the ambient is represented in the thermal model. Since radiation 
feedback from the compartment is neglected, the model is conservative (i.e., the steel 
temperatures during the heating phase would be slightly higher than what the results 
suggest). The emissivity is specified as 0.9 and the sink temperature amplitude is equal to 
the upper layer gas temperature history from the CFAST results. 
 
In addition to interaction properties, the thermal model also imposes 33 separate 
constraints. Each of these constraints utilizes the Tie method to fuse model instances 
together. The thermal model contains a single predefined field which specifies the initial 
temperature of the steel (20 ºC). A full analysis was performed on a single-processor of a 
Sunfire X4100 machine with a FP rating of 117 and 4 GB of RAM. The memory policy 
of the job run was set to the default (moderate). The job lasted approximately 17 hours 
and underwent 350 increments of analysis. The results of this thermal analysis are 
discussed in Section 6.1. 
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Figure 73: Thermal Model Assembly 
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Figure 74: Meshing of the Thermal Model Assembly 
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5.5 Development of the Thermal-Stress Model 
ABAQUS has been used to create both a mechanical and thermal model of the four 
structural bays of interest in WTC 5. The thermal model captures the heat transfer 
behavior of the structure when it is exposed to the reconstructed fire event. More 
precisely, the thermal model provides the temperature distribution of the structural 
assembly in both three-dimensional space and time. The mechanical model captures the 
stress behavior of the structure when subjected to its service load.  
 
In order to fully understand the performance of the WTC 5 assembly during its fire 
exposure on September 11, 2001, the thermal model must be combined with the 
mechanical model: the result is a sequentially-coupled, thermal stress model. Since the 
stress behavior depends upon the temperature, but not vice versa (frictional heating is 
negligible), a sequentially-coupled model yields accurate results; a fully-coupled, 
thermal-stress analysis was not required. It was also assumed that the steel insulation 
stays completely attached during the fire exposure. 
 
The sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model is essentially a copy of the mechanical 
model with critical changes. The thermal-stress model has the same parts, mesh elements, 
interactions (friction included), constraints, loads (service load and bolt pretension), and 
boundary conditions (e.g., prevention of lateral torsional buckling) as the mechanical 
model (see Section 5.3 for a detailed description of these model features). In the thermal-
stress model, the use of temperature-dependent steel properties is crucial. Figure 57 
above is the test data from Harmathy that captures the stress-strain behavior of A36 steel 
at elevated temperatures; this data was used as input into the model. Additionally, the 
instantaneous coefficient of thermal expansion changes with elevated temperatures (as 
described in Section 5.1).  
 
The mechanical model is composed of three analysis steps: Contact, Pretension, and 
Load. A fourth analysis step was added for the thermal-stress model: the Thermal step. 
This fourth step has a time period of 28,000 seconds (approximately 8 hours), which 
encompasses the heating and cooling phases of the fire event. The specified maximum 
increment size for this step is 80 seconds in order to maintain a reasonable time 
resolution. The solution technique for this step is the same as that for the previous steps 
(Full Newton (Direct)). A predefined field was applied to the entire model: the 
distribution of this field is derived from the results of the thermal model. The meshes of 
this model and the thermal model are compatible, and interpolation of midside nodes was 
specified. Essentially, the Thermal step maintains the gravity load applied during the 
Load step, and then applies the temperature history of the steel which is variable in three-
dimensional space and time. 
 
For this analysis, a field output request was specified as an addition to the default stress 
analysis result variables. Nodal temperature (NT) was requested for the results. This 
allows for viewing of the steel temperature and deformation performance simultaneously. 
A full analysis was performed on four parallel processors of a Sunfire X4100 (quad-core) 
machine with a FP rating of 117 and 4 GB of RAM (per processor). The memory policy 
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of the job run was set to the maximum for fully-devoted processing power. The job lasted 
approximately 48 hours and underwent 530 increments of analysis (501 increments in the 
Thermal step). The results of the sequentially-couple, thermal-stress analysis are 
discussed in Section 6.2. 
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6 Finite Element Modeling Results 
6.1 Results of the Thermal Analysis 
ABAQUS was used to create a thermal model that encompasses the heat transfer 
behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of WTC 5 when exposed to 
the reconstructed fire. Results from this model serve as input into the final model: a 
sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress analysis of the four structural bays of interest. The 
temperature distribution of the steel in space and time is derived from the analysis.  
 
Figure 75 below shows the temperature distribution of the steel assembly after 1 hour of 
fire exposure (the insulation has been removed from the results rendering for illustrative 
purposes). The limits of the contour plot are as follows: upper limit (red) is 720 ºC 
(maximum temperature the upper layer gas temperature reaches) and the lower limit 
(blue) is 20 ºC (ambient temperature). It is observed that the concrete slab acts as a heat 
sink for the steel assembly. This is illustrated in Figure 75 below, for the steel 
temperature is lower at higher elevations (near the concrete slab).  
 
Using the “probe” capability of the software, it was determined that the temperature 
gradient between the end of the beam stem welded to the column and its other end at the 
shear connection is approximately 450 ºC after one hour of fire exposure. Moreover, the 
interface between the beam stem and column is kept relatively cool. This clearly proves 
one of the hypotheses of this project: the Gerber beam design thermally isolates the shear 
connections from their heat sinks (the columns). More precisely, since heat at the shear 
connection must travel across the entire length of the beam stem (4 feet) before it reaches 
the heat sink, heat builds up quickly in the vicinity of the bolt holes. The interface of the 
beam stem and the column is kept relatively cool during the fire exposure. This can be 
attributed to the efficient dissipation of heat at this location, for heat is transmitted 
through the steel faster than the heat from the fire is conducted through the insulation. 
Table 9 below summarizes the thermal results at future points in time, which includes the 
heating and cooling of the structural assembly. 
 
Table 9: Summary of Thermal Analysis Results 
 
Reference Duration of Analysis 
(Fire: t < 4 hours) 
(Burnout: t > 4 hours) 
Temperature Gradient 
(Across Beam Stem) 
(Left-to-Right) 
Figure 75 1 hour 450 ºC 
Figure 76 2 hours 450 ºC 
Figure 77 3 hours 250 ºC 
Figure 78 4 hours Negligible 
Figure 79 5 hours -150 ºC 
Figure 80 6 hours -150 ºC 
Figure 81 7 hours -150 ºC 
Figure 82 8 hours -50 ºC 
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Figure 75: Steel Temperature Distribution (1 Hour of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 76: Steel Temperature Distribution (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 77: Steel Temperature Distribution (3 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 78: Steel Temperature Distribution (4 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 79: Steel Temperature Distribution (5 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 80: Steel Temperature Distribution (6 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 81: Steel Temperature Distribution (7 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 82: Steel Temperature Distribution (8 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 83 below shows the beam stem and shear tab assembly after 1 hour of fire 
exposure with the insulation included in the rendering. It is observed that the insulation 
functions as predicted: it delays the transmission of heat to the steel during the fire 
exposure. Moreover, it can be observed that the top of the assembly remains relatively 
cool due to the heat sink effect of the concrete slab above it.  
 
Figure 84 below is the same assembly as shown in Figure 83, but after 2 hours of fire 
exposure. This figure acts as a critical check of the thermal model. The ASTM E-119 test 
is used as a basis for the insulation requirements in the UL Fire Resistance Directory. 
Prior to its specification in the directory, a single beam with 1-in. of mineral fiber 
insulation was tested in a furnace. After about 2 hours, the temperature of the steel beam 
probably reached a specified “critical temperature” of around 600 ºC. Although, the real 
fire in WTC 5 was different from the furnace fire, Figure 84 below does provide a 
validation of the model because it is observed that the steel temperature is about 600 ºC 
after 2 hours of fire exposure.  
 
Section 10.1.1 of this report presents an estimated thermal analysis of the steel girders 
located in WTC 5. It is interesting to compare the results of the sophisticated finite 
element thermal analysis as described in this section to those hand calculations performed 
in Section 10.1.1. Figure 85 below is the predicted temperature of the steel girder as a 
function of fire exposure time according to the hand calculations. These hand calculations 
assume a uniform temperature distribution through the steel at any given point in time. 
Figure 75 through Figure 82 above show that this assumption not always reasonable. As 
another baseline check on the thermal model, a rough estimation of the average steel 
temperature across the beam stem span was determined from the finite element model 
results. These values are compared to the temperatures predicted by hand calculations in 
Table 10 below. 
 
 
Table 10: Comparison of Hand Calculations and FEM Analysis Results 
 
Time 
[hours] 
Uniform Steel 
Temperature [ºC] 
(Hand Calculations) 
Average Steel 
Temperature 
(FEM Analysis) 
Steel Temperature at 
Bolt Holes 
(FEM Analysis) 
1 291 300 600 
2 483 450 700 
3 522 500 600 
4 410 400 350 
 
 
Table 10 above shows that hand calculations characterize the average steel temperature 
reasonable well. Yet, the hand calculations do not provide any information concerning 
the distribution of the temperature, which is very drastic and important in this case. 
Therefore, hand calculations alone may misguide a designer. In the case of the WTC 5 
structural assembly, the hand calculations grossly under-predict the steel temperature in 
the vicinity of the shear connection during the heating phase of the fire. 
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Figure 83: Beam Stem/Shear Tab Assembly with Insulation (1 Hour of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 84: Beam Stem/Shear Tab Assembly with Insulation (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 85: Predicted Steel Temperature History During Fire Exposure (Hand Calculations) 
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6.2 Results of the Thermal-Stress Analysis 
ABAQUS was used to create a sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model that 
encompasses the global behavior of the four structural bays of interest on the 8th floor of 
WTC 5 when exposed to the reconstructed fire. This model serves as an accurate 
reconstruction of the quasi-dynamic thermal-stress behaviors that occurred and led to 
progressive structural collapse. This model integrates a vast amount of research and is 
capable of representing highly-nonlinear thermal and mechanical behaviors.  
 
The structural assembly is initially at ambient temperature (20 °C) carrying the specified 
gravity loads with minimal deflection. As the compartment heats up in the first hour of 
fire exposure, the steel assembly slowly increases in temperature (as described in Section 
6.1). As the steel heats up, it undergoes thermal expansion which causes the floor girder 
to elongate significantly and close the gap between it and the beam stem. This elongation 
causes relatively harmless compressive stress concentrations to form on the strong side 
(i.e., toward the beam stem span) of the bolt holes (see Figure 86 below).  
 
As the assembly continues to increase in temperature, the steel’s rigidity decreases 
steadily and the floor girder begins to undergo significant deflection. Figure 87 below 
shows the stress distribution in the vicinity of the shear connection after one hour of fire 
exposure. It is apparent that the floor girder has deflected significantly. In fact, the floor 
girder has deflected enough for its lower flange to contact and penetrate the beam stem 
web. This phenomenon shall be referred to as the formation of a fulcrum point. At this 
time during the fire exposure, the top bolt continues to bear against the strong (left) side 
of the bolt hole due to the influence of thermal expansion of the floor girder. Forensic 
evidence suggests that the top bolt was bearing against the weak (right) side of the bolt 
hole at failure. It should be noted that the values of stress are not important at elevated 
temperatures as discussed in Section 5.2; Figure 87 simply serves as a convenient 
representation of where the stress concentrations exist. 
 
Figure 88 shows the stress distribution in the vicinity of the shear connection after 2 
hours of fire exposure. At this point in time during the fire exposure, the loss of rigidity 
in the steel has “outpaced” its thermal expansion. More precisely, the floor girder has 
deflected by a much greater margin than it is expanding. Recall from Figure 87 that the 
thermal expansion aids in the stability of the shear connection by holding the floor girder 
close to the beam stem across their entire cross-sections. Figure 88 shows that the top bolt 
has undergone a sudden stress reversal and is now bearing against the weak side of the 
bolt hole. This stress reversal can be attributed to the fulcrum mechanism which has fully 
formed at this point in time during the fire exposure. The fulcrum mechanism has fully 
formed because tensile stresses surrounding the lower flange’s penetration into the beam 
stem web have arrested further penetration in this region. Therefore, the fulcrum point 
has been fully established because this point can now resist the movement of the floor 
girder’s lower flange. This phenomenon is analogous to using the back end of a hammer 
to pry a nail out of a wall; the nail is analogous to the top bolt.  
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Plastic shear strain is the failure criterion that is used to assess when web tear out failure 
occurs at the shear connection as the forensic evidence suggests (see Section 5.2 for a 
detailed discussion of this failure criterion). Figure 89 below shows the plastic shear 
strain distribution in the vicinity of the bolt hole after 2 hours of fire exposure. The limits 
of the contour plot are set as -0.16 and 0.16; plastic shear strain exceeding these limits 
represents rupture failure according to the failure criterion determination model. In Figure 
89, it can be observed that the regions in black and white are outside the failure limits. In 
fact, the maximum plastic shear strain at the top bolt hole is 0.33, which clearly 
represents that rupture has occurred by this point in the fire exposure. Figure 90 shows a 
close-up view of plastic shear strain at the top bolt hole.  
 
The plastic shear strain actually demonstrates a “runaway” failure at this point in time. 
More precisely, the plastic shear strain reaches values that are triple and quadruple the 
failure limit over the course of only minutes in the model analysis. Figure 91 below 
shows the plastic shear stress distribution after 2 hours and 15 minutes of fire exposure. 
In reality, the shear connection would have undergone catastrophic failure prior to this 
point in the fire exposure. The shear planes are consistent with those observed from the 
forensic evidence. More precisely, the shear planes are about -15 degrees from the x-axis, 
in which the x-axis runs parallel to the span of the floor girder. 
 
When the top bolt fails (i.e., pulls out of the beam stem web), there are only two bolts left 
to carry the largely deflecting floor girder. Although the bottom two bolts are bearing 
against the strong side of their bolt holes in Figure 88 and Figure 89 below, the failure of 
the top bolt would surely have caused a stress reversal. This stress reversal would cause 
the two remaining bolts to bear against the weak side of their respective bolt holes. These 
two bolts would then tear out from the beam stem in the same manner as the top bolt. 
Once the top bolt has failed, the failure of the remaining two bolts would happen almost 
instantaneously; this can be referred to as an “un-zipping” effect.  
 
Figure 92 below presents a comparison between the model’s results and forensic 
evidence. The left side of Figure 92 shows the equivalent strain in the vicinity of the three 
bolt holes in the beam stem web after 2 hours of fire exposure. The right side of Figure 
92 shows a recovered beam stem sample from WTC 5 that serves as forensic evidence of 
the structural failure. It is observed that the failure in the finite element model is very 
similar to the failed structural specimen. More precisely, the angles at which the bolts 
pried against the bolt holes are similar. The top bolt bears against the weak side of its bolt 
hole at about 15 degree below the horizontal. The bottom bears against the strong side of 
its bolt hole initially, but as a result of the failure of the top bolt hole, pulls outs from the 
beam stem web in the direction of the floor girder. 
 
Figure 93 and Figure 94 below present photographic evidence that a fulcrum point 
mechanism formed prior to catastrophic failure. It is observed that penetrations were 
made toward the lower part of the beam stem webs. This is in the region that the thermal-
stress model predicted the lower flange of the floor girder would penetrate into the beam 
stem web. These photographs represent more key articles of forensic evidence which help 
to validate the results of the thermal-stress model.  
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The sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model has estimated that the time in which 
catastrophic structural collapse occurred within WTC 5 was approximately two hours. 
This model captures all the relevant properties of steel except for its thermal creep strain. 
In addition, radiation from the compartment was neglected; only radiation to the ambient 
was considered. Lastly, the steel decking which supported the concrete slab in WTC 5 
was not explicitly modeled. Instead, it was assumed that the concrete slab was in uniform 
contact with the top flange of the members. In reality, the ribbed geometry of the decking 
would decrease the heat sink effect of the concrete, for a fraction of the top flanges’ 
surface area would not be in contact with the floor assembly. The exclusion of creep 
strain, the rigorous treatment of radiation feedback, and the steel decking would suggest 
that the failure occurred slightly earlier than the thermal-stress model has predicted. This 
is because the steel temperatures in the vicinity of the shear connections would have been 
slightly higher than predicted at any given point in time during the heating phase of the 
fire.
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Figure 86: Stress Distribution (30 Minutes of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 87: Stress Distribution (1 Hour of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 88: Stress Distribution (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
 119 
 
 
 
Figure 89: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 90: Plastic Shear Strain at the Top Bolt Hole (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 91: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours, 15 Minutes of Model Run Time) 
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Figure 92: Comparison of FEM Results (Equivalent Strain After 2 Hours of Fire Exposure) Versus Forensic Evidence (Recovered Sample) 
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Figure 93: Evidence of the Formation of a Fulcrum Point (1 of 2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 94: Evidence of the Formation of a Fulcrum Point (2 of 2) 
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7 Sensitivity Analyses 
7.1 Mesh Refinement 
According to the sequentially-coupled thermal-stress model, the catastrophic, progressive 
collapse within WTC 5 occurred at approximately 2 hours into the fire exposure. The 
meshes of this model were very fine in order to prevent overclosure errors in ABAQUS. 
For instance, the mesh in the vicinity of the bolt holes was defined so as to create smooth 
circular holes using hexahedral elements around their circumferences. Therefore, the 
results described in Section 6 are very accurate. The results may be very accurate, but it is 
still beneficial to further refine the meshes and determine if the results change by an 
appreciable margin. If the results do not change by an appreciable margin then it can be 
concluded that the results are mesh-independent. 
 
Table 11 below compares the number of elements used for particular model parts in the 
original thermal-stress model (Section 5.5) to that in which the meshes are further 
refined. Only those model parts in the vicinity of the shear connection were refined. 
Moreover, the mesh of the floor girder (fine mesh section) was dramatically refined in 
order for its elements to have comparable sizes to that of the beam stem web (fine mesh 
section). This is important since the bottom flange of the floor girder penetrates the beam 
stem web in the formation of the fulcrum point mechanism. Figure 95 below illustrates 
the refinement of the meshes in the vicinity of the shear connection. 
 
 
Table 11: Number of Elements Used for Each Model Part (Mesh Refinement) 
 
Model Part Original Model Refined Model 
Beam Stem (Fine Mesh Section) 16,626 37,611 
Beam Stem (Intermediate Mesh Section) 198 423 
Beam Stem (Coarse Mesh Section) 244 244 
Bolt 964 4,296 
Column 304 304 
Shear Tab 2,688 8,232 
Steel Shim 2,184 2,184 
Floor Girder (Fine Mesh Section) 14,706 64,444 
Floor Girder (Intermediate Mesh Section) 168 387 
Floor Girder (Coarse Mesh Section) 800 800 
Total: 38,882 113,248 
 
 
A full analysis was performed on four parallel processors of a Sunfire X4100 (quad-core) 
machine with a FP rating of 117 and 4 GB of RAM (per processor). The memory policy 
of the job run was set to the maximum for fully devoted processing power. The job was 
only allowed to run to 3 hours of fire exposure since previous results have rendered the 
remainder of the analysis as meaningless (i.e., the cooling phase after failure has already 
occurred).  
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Figure 96 below shows the plastic shear strain distribution in the vicinity of the shear 
connection after about 2 hours of fire exposure. The limits of the contour plot are -0.16 to 
0.16, which represents the failure limit; any regions of black or white are outside the 
failure limits for plastic shear strain. Using the “probe” function in ABAQUS, it was 
determined that the top bolt hole has a maximum plastic shear strain of 0.25. Similar to 
the original thermal-stress model, it can be concluded that the catastrophic, progressive 
failure occurred at about 2 hours into the fire exposure. As mentioned, the thermal-stress 
model experiences a “runaway” failure in which the plastic shear strain reaches values in 
excess of triple the failure point.  
 
Figure 97 and Figure 98 below show the plastic shear distribution after 2 hours and 15 
minutes of fire exposure. The maximum plastic shear strain at the top bolt hole is 0.47. 
Figure 99 shows the stress distribution in the vicinity of the shear connection. Similar to 
the previous thermal-stress model, an excessive stress concentration at the weak side of 
the top bolt hole is observed at this point in time during the fire exposure. This extended 
analysis has confirmed the results described in Section 6.2, for the intensive refinement 
of the meshes in the model did not result in any appreciable change in the observed 
results. 
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Figure 95: Refined Mesh at the Shear Connection 
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Figure 96: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 97: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours, 15 Minutes of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 98: Plastic Shear Strain at the Top Bolt Hole (2 Hours, 15 Minutes of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 99: Stress Distribution (2 Hours, 15 Minutes of Fire Exposure) 
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7.2 Higher Temperature Fire Scenario 
ABAQUS was used to derive the steel temperature distribution in three-dimensional 
space and time when the structural assembly is exposed to the reconstructed fire (see 
Section 6.1). Since WTC 5 allowed rapid heat venting during its fire exposure by means 
of impact holes in the roof of the western portion of the building, the peak temperature of 
the upper gas layer only reached about 700 °C. According to the 2005 NIST study, the 
peak temperature reached inside WTC 1 was approximately 1000 °C. The peak 
temperature of 700 °C is the most accurate estimate for the fire that occurred in WTC 5, 
but it is beneficial to test a higher peak temperature in order to ensure that the thermal 
model in ABAQUS is stable and follows a reasonable pattern of behavior.  
 
Figure 100 below shows the upper layer gas temperature history derived from CFAST 
(see Section 4) that served as input into the thermal model described in Section 5.4. This 
figure also shows a modified temperature history that peaks at 1000 °C; this curve was 
manually derived using engineering judgment. This higher peak temperature curve was 
inputted into the thermal model and the results were derived. Figure 101 below shows the 
structural assembly after 1 hour of fire exposure; the upper limit of the contour plot (red) 
is 1000 °C. The maximum temperature of the steel in the vicinity of the bolt holes is 600 
°C. Figure 102 below shows the structural assembly after 1.5 hours of fire exposure. The 
maximum temperature of the steel in the vicinity of the bolt holes is 770 °C. Finally, 
Figure 103 below shows the structural assembly after 2 hours of fire exposure. This is 
approximately the time in which the steel has reached its peak temperature of 800 °C in 
the vicinity of the bolt holes for this case. 
 
This sensitivity analysis proves that the thermal model is stable and the steel temperatures 
calculated in Section 6.1 were not a coincidence. Applying a higher peak temperature 
does not increase the speed at which the steel heats up or its peak temperature in any type 
of dramatic fashion (see Table 12 below). Instead, the thermal inertia of the insulation 
and the steel resists dramatic changes in steel temperature over the course of the fire 
exposure. The higher temperature fire scenario does produce a higher peak steel 
temperature, but it is physically reasonable and would be expected upon analyzing the 
results from Section 6.1.  
 
 
Table 12: Steel Temperature in the Vicinity of the Bolt Holes 
 
Fire Exposure Time WTC 5 Fire Exposure Elevated Fire Exposure 
1 Hour 600 °C 600 °C 
1.5 Hours 680 °C 770 °C 
2 Hours 720 °C 800 °C 
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Figure 100: Comparison of Upper Gas Layer Temperature Histories (Greater Intensity Fire Scenario)
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Figure 101: Temperature Distribution After 1 Hour of Exposure (Greater Intensity Fire Scenario) 
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Figure 102: Temperature Distribution After 1.5 Hours of Exposure (Greater Intensity Fire Scenario) 
 135 
 
 
 
Figure 103: Temperature Distribution After 2 Hours of Exposure (Greater Intensity Fire Scenario) 
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7.3 Oversized Bolt Holes 
According to the AISC Guide to Design Criteria for Bolted and Riveted Joints, bolt holes 
may be to be oversized for construction purposes. More precisely, larger bolt holes are 
sometimes used to meet tolerances during erection and to avoid rigid alignment 
conditions. For 7/8 in. diameter bolts, as were used for WTC 5 at the shear connections, 
the maximum hole size allowed is 1-1/16 in. diameter. It is valuable to test the use of 
oversized bolt holes in the WTC 5 thermal-stress model in hope of arresting the fulcrum 
point mechanism which leads to catastrophic failure.  
 
The bolt holes in the WTC 5 thermal-stress model were changed from 15/16 in. to 1-1/16 
in. diameter and the analysis was run. Figure 104 below is a contour plot of the plastic 
shear strain in the vicinity of the shear connection after 2 hours of exposure. The limits of 
the contour plot are set as -0.16 and 0.16; plastic shear strain exceeding these limits 
represents rupture failure according to the failure criterion model. Regions in black and 
white would be considered outside the failure limits. It is observed that after 2 hours, the 
top bolt has not reached its failure limit for rupture as of yet. Figure 105 below shows the 
same contour plot after 2 hours and 15 minutes of fire exposure. It is observed that the 
top bolt has reached its failure limit and would experience catastrophic failure.  
 
It was hoped that using oversized bolt holes would arrest, or at least significantly delay, 
the formation of a fulcrum point mechanism by allowing for more translational freedom 
of the bolt shanks within their respective holes. Yet, the result of the thermal-stress 
analysis suggests that this provision would only slightly delay the onset of catastrophic 
failure. In reality, the failure would probably occur at the about the same time as for the 
smaller holes, for the clear distance is reduced when oversized holes are used. Perhaps 
the use of slotted holes may be beneficial, for they may allow for large rotation at the 
shear connection with limited bearing stress. The implementation of slotted holes 
represents the introduction of new geometry into the finite element model, as opposed to 
modifying existing geometry. Hence, the implementation of slotted holes into the 
thermal-stress model would require major modifications and is out of the scope of this 
research.  
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Figure 104: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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Figure 105: Plastic Shear Strain (2 Hours, 15 Minutes of Fire Exposure) 
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7.4 Thermal Creep Strain 
Creep is the term used to describe the time-dependent deformation of materials under 
constant load. Under most conditions, creep is only a concern for structural members 
with very high permanent loads. Moreover, creep is negligible in structural steel at 
normal temperatures. However, creep becomes very significant at steel temperatures over 
500 °C and is highly dependent on the stress level. At high temperatures, creep 
deformations in steel can accelerate rapidly, leading the plastic behavior and “runaway” 
failure (Buchanan 144-145).  
 
Creep strain is not usually included explicitly in structural fire protection engineering 
calculations because of its complexity and the lack of sufficient input data. Any structural 
analysis computer program for elevated temperature is already very complex without 
having to explicitly include the effects of time-dependent behavior. The effects of creep 
are usually allowed for implicitly by using stress-strain relationships which include an 
allowance for the amount of creep that could be expected in a structural member exposed 
to fire (145).  
 
Since the data available for thermal creep strain are extremely limited, the author chose to 
run the finite element models without this effect explicitly included. Yet, it is beneficial 
to perform a sensitivity study in which this phenomenon is explicitly included in the 
sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model of the structural assembly in WTC 5. The 
deformation of steel at elevated temperatures is dependent upon three components of 
strain which are shown in Equation 11 (194).  
 
( ) ( ) ( )tTTT crth ,,, σεσεεε σ ++=∆    (11) 
 
( )Tthε  : Thermal expansion component 
 
( )T,σεσ  : Stress-related strain 
 
( )tT ,,σεσ  : Thermal creep strain 
 
The models described in this research have fully integrated the effects of thermal 
expansion and stress-related strain. For this sensitivity analysis, the third and least 
understood component of strain will be integrated. SGH has developed an algorithm for 
creep strain that is compatible with the finite element software ANSYS. This algorithm 
was adapted for use in ABAQUS and is shown below (Equation 12). 
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( ) ( ) ( )TCTC tTC
dt
d
32
1 σ
ε
=
   (12) 
 
=T  Temperature [°C] 
 
=σ  Von Mises equivalent stress [MPa] 
 
=t  Time [sec] 
 
( )TC1 , ( )TC2 , and ( )TC3  are temperature-dependent parameters that can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )Tc
uRT
Tb
TbTaTC 










=
σ
5.70
60
1
100
1
1  
 
( ) ( )TcTC =1  
 
( ) ( ) 13 −= TbTC  
 
 
( ) 0=Ta   (for T < 350 °C) 
( ) ( )TTa 00573.01.610 +−=   (for 350 °C < T < 500 °C) 
( ) ( )TTa 00851.025.1310 −−=   (for 500 °C < T < 725 °C) 
 
 
( ) TTb 0035.01.1 +−=  (for T < 725 °C) 
 
( ) TTc 0064.01.2 +=  (for T < 725 °C) 
 
uRTσ = Reference ultimate stress [MPa] 
 
The expressions shown above were integrated into the thermal-stress model in ABAQUS. 
It was determined that the “runaway” failure described in Section 6.2 still occurs at 
approximately 2 hours into the fire exposure (see Figure 106 below). In other words, 
adding the effects of thermal creep strain does not change the results described in Section 
6.2 as it pertains to catastrophic failure of the shear connection. This makes physical 
sense because creep is time-dependent; the stress reversal due to the formation of a 
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fulcrum point mechanism occurs very rapidly and leads to rupture failure within a few 
minutes following. Therefore, the effects of thermal creep strain would be minimal in this 
case granted the limited time in which it may occur. However, the effects of thermal 
creep strain are observed in another -less critical- aspect of the thermal-stress behavior. It 
is observed that the deformation of the bolt holes in the downward direction is more 
extensive as compared to the results described in Section 6.2 (see Figure 106 below). 
This is physically reasonable considering that gravity loads act upon the assembly over a 
prolonged period of time when the steel temperatures are high.  
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Figure 106: Plastic Shear Strain with Thermal Creep Strain Included (2 Hours of Fire Exposure) 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Structural Fire Performance of WTC 5 
The fire that occurred within WTC 5 has been estimated using relevant data and 
computer modeling. More precisely, the upper layer gas temperature history that engulfed 
the structural assembly on the 8th floor (the initial location of collapse) was 
approximated. The official construction documents of WTC 5 were referenced to 
determine the dimensions of the steel assembly accurately. Using this information, finite 
element models were created. These models included a thermal, mechanical, and a 
thermal-stress type. The thermal model captured the heating behavior of the insulated 
steel assembly when exposed to the reconstructed fire and its following cooling phase. 
The mechanical model captured the stress behavior of the steel when gravity loads are 
applied. Modifications were made to the mechanical model, and the output result from 
the thermal model was used to create a sequentially-coupled, thermal-stress model. This 
model was used to derive the structural fire performance of WTC 5 when exposed to the 
reconstructed fire. 
 
Results of the thermal-stress model demonstrate that WTC 5 experienced a catastrophic, 
progressive structural collapse during the heating phase of its fire exposure. This model 
predicts a “runaway” bolt rupture failure at approximately 2 hours of fire exposure. It is 
not the precise time of failure which is paramount, but the fact that the structure failed 
during the heating phase, as opposed to the cooling phase, which would have been 
expected based upon current knowledge and experience of structural fire performance. In 
a general sense, this early failure is very surprising, but in view of the construction details 
of WTC 5, this failure is physically reasonable. More precisely, the Gerber beam design 
used for floors 5 through 8 of WTC 5 possesses certain details which make it inherently 
weak in terms of fire endurance. 
 
The Gerber beam design isolates the shear connection from its heat sink to the rest of the 
“cooler” structure via the column. The results of the thermal model demonstrate how this 
isolation causes the shear connection to become 450 °C hotter than the interface at the 
column after two hours (see Figure 76 above). It is apparent that locating the connections 
at the column interfaces would have kept the connections from reaching highly-elevated 
temperatures during the fire exposure, for they would have been able to dissipate heat 
efficiently. In the case of the Gerber beam design, the only way for a connection to 
dissipate its heat is to conduct it across the relatively-thin thermal mass (i.e., the beam 
stem) to eventually reach the heat sink. This heating phenomenon is exacerbated by the 
fact that the shear connection has a relatively-high surface area to volume ratio, which 
allows for efficient heating via turbulent convection from the hot upper layer gases. 
Moreover, the beam stem itself was heated by the fire exposure which reduces the 
thermal flow from the shear connection toward the column. 
 
As the structural assembly on the 8th floor heats up in the first hour of the fire exposure, 
the floor girder undergoes thermal expansion, which causes relatively harmless 
compressive stress concentrations to form on the strong side of the bolt holes (see Figure 
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86 above). As the fire exposure approaches the 2-hour mark, the decrease in the rigidity 
of the girder begins to “outpace” the thermal expansion and the girder deflects 
significantly. The deflection causes the lower flange of the floor girder to form a fulcrum 
point mechanism which leads to the top bolt rupture failure at approximately 2 hours of 
fire exposure (see Figure 88 and Figure 89 above). Once the top bolt experiences this 
“runaway” rupture failure, the two remaining bolts would undergo a stress reversal and 
rupture quickly in sequence (“unzipping” failure).  
 
The initial structural collapse on the 8th floor of WTC 5 due to fire exposure alone led to 
the progressive collapse through the 5th floor below it. These collapses were due to the 
kinetic energy of the falling debris from the 8th floor and subsequent floors below. It is 
likely that this collapse would have progressed all of the way down to the ground level, if 
it had not been for a particular architectural feature of the building. In Figure 1 above, it 
is observed that the 4th floor cantilevers toward the adjacent streets. By observing the 
structural details of WTC 5, it was determined that moment-type connections were used 
on the 4th floor to accommodate this cantilever design (see Figure 39 above).  
 
The moment-type connections on the 4th floor were most likely able to arrest the 
progressive collapse of the four floors above it. More precisely, the moment-type 
connections were probably able to prevent beam stem rupture, for the strong flange 
connections were capable of preventing a fulcrum point mechanism from occurring. 
Whereas large deflections due to fire exposure on the 8th floor caused rupture failure, 
floors 7 through 5 experienced rupture failure from the large girder deflections due to the 
impact of falling debris. The moment-type connections on the 4th floor most likely 
prevented these large deflections, for the entire beam stem and floor girder assembly 
would have effectively acted as a single fixed-ended span. 
 
The 9th floor of the building experienced a similar fire exposure as the 8th floor, but it did 
not collapse. In fact, forensic evidence demonstrates that the beams reached the catenary 
phase and remained stable (see Figure 21 above). The only difference between the 
structural assembly on the 8th floor and that on the 9th floor is the location of the shear 
connections. On the 9th floor conventional-type construction was used in which the floor 
girders are connected directly to the columns. This design feature allows for efficient 
dissipation of heat at the connections during a fire exposure. The 8th floor utilized the 
Gerber beam design, which isolated the shear connections from their heat sinks and led to 
a rapid decrease in steel strength in the vicinity of the connections.  
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8.2 Critical Implications of Findings 
It has been concluded that the catastrophic, progressive structural collapse that involved 
four floors of WTC 5 most probably occurred during the heating phase of the fire 
exposure, at about 2 hours from the time of ignition. WTC 5 utilized the Gerber beam 
design which is currently used for approximately 20,000 existing steel buildings in the 
U.S. and continues to be a popular design option.  
 
The Gerber beam design has application to high-rise buildings. During a fire event in a 
high-rise building, only those occupants on the floors in the direct vicinity of the fire are 
instructed to evacuate via relatively narrow stairways. Other occupants are ordered to 
stay inside the building and wait to egress during this phased-type evacuation. In fact, 
those occupants on the floors near the fire are often merely relocated to another floor of 
the building. Phased evacuations are necessary since high-rise building egress systems 
are never designed for full evacuation of all the occupants at once; otherwise, the 
stairways would need to be extremely wide. Thus, occupants of a high-rise building may 
be required to stay inside the building many hours after a fire has started. In the 1993 
bombing incident at WTC 1, it took approximately 6 hours to evacuate the entire building 
(Blossom 76).    
 
The Gerber beam design has application to hospitals. During a fire event in a hospital, a 
“defend-in-place” strategy is utilized in which patients are kept inside the building. 
Moving patients out of the hospital would take an extended amount of time and may 
adversely affect the welfare of those patients (e.g., patients on life support). Thus, the fire 
alarm system in a hospital is most always set to private mode and patients not located on 
the fire floor are not moved. This “defend-in-place” strategy relies upon the fire 
department to extinguish the fire, and then patients are slowly evacuated. It should be 
noted that firefighters enter buildings during the heating phase of fires to attempt to 
extinguish them. Therefore, the conclusions of this research demonstrate a previously 
unappreciated risk to firefighters attempting to fight fires in buildings utilizing the Gerber 
beam design. 
 
In general, sprinklers systems are reliable and efficient, but there are still concerns. 
During earthquakes, the water mains of a sprinkler system could easily rupture, for they 
are stiff and fragile elements without seismic dampers. Moreover, there may be a 
complete loss of city water supplies. In addition, the probability of ignition after an 
earthquake is high because of toppled furniture, electrical malfunction and movement of 
hot equipment. There are many examples of serious fires following earthquakes, 
including San Francisco in 1906 and 1989, Tokyo in 1923, and Napier, New Zealand in 
1931 (Buchanan 26-27).  
 
The possibility of a fire occurring during the construction process, or during alterations, 
is often overlooked, despite many serious losses. The fire hazard will usually be greater 
during construction than at any other time in the life of the building because of the 
increased number of ignition sources. For example, there are many recorded cases of 
ignition from cutting and welding during construction, some leading to massive fire 
losses. There are also documented cases of fires spreading through unprotected concealed 
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spaces which were created during alterations (28-30). During construction and alterations 
of a building, the structure itself is the only measure that can be relied upon to resist 
damage from a potential fire. 
 
During normal conditions, a sprinkler system may not operate during a fire exposure for 
one of the following reasons: poor maintenance, inadequate design, shut valves, or poor 
water supply. In many cases, the sprinkler system within a building is not designed to 
extinguish the fire, but rather to control the spread of the fire. For example, the sprinkler 
system for a plastic commodity storage facility would only be designed to increase the 
time available to firefighters to extinguish the fire; the application of a hose stream is 
required for extinguishment.  
 
Buildings are continually facing new hazards such as car bombs and arson. Sprinkler 
systems are only designed to extinguish small fires in their incipient phase. More 
precisely, the hydraulic calculations assume that only a small percentage of the sprinklers 
will actuate and they will be in only a single location. Therefore, an arsonist who ignites 
multiple, dispersed fires could overpower a given sprinkler system with ease. This is not 
to mention that an explosion could cause a large percentage of sprinklers to actuate at 
once.  
 
The bottom line is that the structure itself is the last line of defense against fire and must 
be designed not a collapse due to a fire event. In terms of structural fire protection 
engineering, WTC 5 did not represent an engineering failure, but rather a failure to 
engineer (for fire exposure). The solutions to structural fire protection engineering 
problems do not necessarily need to be elaborate (e.g., designing a “fortress”), but rather 
well-engineered. Whereas structural design for seismic and wind considerations is 
performance-based, structural fire protection is still primarily prescriptive and/or 
proprietary. This fact has the unfortunate effect of preventing engineers from fully 
understanding and designing for building performance during fires. 
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8.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
In general, there has been limited research into the fire performance of bolted connections 
in structural assemblies. It has been numerically demonstrated that the catastrophic, 
progressive collapse involving four floors of WTC 5 occurred during the heating phase of 
the fire exposure. It is recommended that full-scale experiments be conducted to verify 
these results. More precisely, a typical structural bay from the 8th floor of WTC 5 should 
be reconstructed and exposed to fire. One inch of mineral fiber insulation should be 
applied to the structural assembly to replicate the conditions as they were in WTC 5. 
Cameras could be directed at the shear connections to capture the hypothesized formation 
of a fulcrum point mechanism that acts as a precursor for failure. Currently, almost no 
structural test results are available for full burnout fires; this recommended testing could 
address this void in data. 
 
If it is indeed confirmed that the Gerber beam design is susceptible to collapse during the 
heating phase of a fire, more research is required to ensure public safety in buildings of 
this type. It is not sufficient to merely identify the problem, but in addition, a solution 
should be sought. In the case of the Gerber beam design, certain hypersensitive structural 
details which contribute to the formation of a fulcrum point failure mechanism may be 
identified. The most apparent hypersensitive details include: the geometry of the bolt 
holes at the shear connection, the construction clearance distance between the beam stem 
and the floor girder at the shear connection, and the location of the shear connection itself 
with respect to its heat sink (i.e., the column).  
 
Currently, the use of finite element software is primarily reserved for research purposes. 
Extended run times and the difficulty of using the software make finite element modeling 
uneconomical for routine structural designs. The finite element models created for this 
project could be further researched and used to devise pre-engineered solutions for the 
building codes. By addressing the influence of the hypersensitive structural details 
identified above, updated methods of using the Gerber beam design could be engineered.  
 
It may be discovered that using slotted-type bolt holes significantly increases the fire 
endurance of the structural assembly by allowing for large rotations without high bearing 
stresses. If this is the case, then provisions may be made to the building code using this 
pre-engineered solution. Therefore, increased fire endurance may be incorporated into 
routine structural work that involves the Gerber beam design. In other words, structural 
engineers that do not necessarily possess knowledge of fire dynamics may create 
structural designs according to the updated code which are inherently resistant to collapse 
in a post-flashover fire. There may be other common structural designs that are prone to 
failure during fire exposure. More engineering research should be conducted to identify 
other opportunities to devise pre-engineered structural solutions for fire endurance.  
 
It has been mentioned that approximately 20,000 existing steel structures in the U.S. 
utilize the Gerber beam design. Since it has been demonstrated that this type of design 
may be prone to failure during the heating phase of a fire, this information should be 
made available to incident commanders of fire departments. Certain incident 
commanders may chose to identify those buildings in their respective districts that utilize 
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construction similar to that identified in WTC 5 because of the increased risk they may 
pose to firefighters. Therefore, these incident commanders can make better informed 
decisions during a fire event, as compared to not having this knowledge. 
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10 Appendices 
10.1  Thermal Analyses 
10.1.1 Simplified Thermal Analysis of the Protected Steel 
Figure 107 below is a schematic of the column-tree and floor girder assembly contained 
in WTC 5. This particular analysis shall focus on the W18X50 floor girder. The floor 
girders of WTC 5 had a 2-hour fire resistance rating. Design No. N715 of the 2004 UL 
Directory specifies that the spray-applied fire resistance must be 1-inch thick in order to 
achieve a 2-hour rating (see Figure 108 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 107: Column-Tree and Girder Assembly 
 
 
 
 
Figure 108: Design No. N715 (Spray-Applied Fire Resistance) 
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The SFPE Handbook provides an expression to predict the heat transfer within insulated 
steel members, in which the thermal capacity of the insulation is accounted for (Equation 
13). The following criteria shall be assumed: the steel is thermally-thin; a lumped-mass 
approach is applicable; and the heat sink effect of the concrete slab will be neglected. 
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The following parameters were substituted into the expression shown above: 
 
Insulation Properties 
3300 m
kg
i =ρ  (density) 
kgK
JC pi 1200=  (specific heat) 
mK
Wk i 12.0=  (thermal conductivity) 
 
A36 Steel Properties 
37850 m
kg
s =ρ  (density) 
kgK
JC ps 520=  (specific heat) 
 
The ASTM E-119 test exposes a steel member to a known gas temperature history. Using 
Equation 13, a spreadsheet was created to derive the change in steel temperature as a 
function of time, as the girder is exposed to the E-119 furnace test (see Figure 109 
below). It is observed that there is a thermal lag in the temperature change of the steel 
over time. The medium, fast, and ultra-fast fire scenarios were also referenced to conduct 
similar analyses (see Figure 110, Figure 111, and Figure 112 below). 
 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted for the insulation thickness of the steel girder for the 
medium growing design fire. It is observed that the peak temperature of the steel 
significantly increases as the thickness of the insulation decreases (see Figure 113 
below). 
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Temperature History of the Steel Girder Exposed to the ASTM E-119 Test
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Figure 109: Temperature History of the Protected Steel Girder (ASTM E-119 Test) 
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Figure 110: Temperature History of the Protected Steel Girder (Medium Growing Fire Scenario) 
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Figure 111: Temperature History of the Protected Steel Girder (Fast Growing Fire Scenario) 
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Figure 112: Temperature History of the Protected Steel Girder (Ultra-Fast Growing Fire Scenario) 
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Figure 113: Insulation Thickness Versus Peak Steel Temperature (Medium Growing Fire Scenario) 
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The SFPE Handbook also provides expressions for determining the yield strength of 
structural steel members at elevated temperatures (Equations 14 and 15).  
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Using Equations 14 and 15, the yield strength for A36 steel was plotted as a function of 
steel temperature (see Figure 114 below). 
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Yield Strength vs. Steel Temperature (A36)
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Figure 114: Yield Strength Versus Steel Temperature (A36 Steel) 
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10.1.2 Simplified Beam Stem Heat Transfer Analysis 
Figure 107 above is a schematic of the column-tree and floor girder assembly contained 
in WTC 5. This particular analysis shall focus on the W24X61 beam stem. It is known 
the column that is shop-welded to the beam stem acts as a heat sink. More precisely, heat 
absorbed by the beam stem during fire exposure is transferred to the column, which is 
then transferred to the other members of the structure. It is valuable to estimate the 
temperature distribution across the length of the beam stem for this case. 
 
Heat transfer involving fins has been thoroughly studied. For this analysis, the beam stem 
shall act as the “fin” of the column. To simply the analysis, the W24X61 beam stem will 
be assumed to have a rectangular cross-section (see Figure 115 below). The temperatures 
at the end of the beam stem and at its base are 600 °C and 400 °C, respectively. 
Moreover, the ambient temperature is 600 °C to represent fire exposure.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 115: Schematic of the Fin Heat Transfer Problem 
 
Since the temperature has been specified at the end of the beam stem, the temperature 
distribution may be derived using Equation 16: 
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gasTT −=θ  
gasbb TT −=θ  
gasLL TT −=θ  
 
kA
hP
m =  
 
fbdP 22 +=  
fdbA =  
 
 
The parameters of this fin heat transfer problem are as follows: 
 
CT ob 400=  (fixed temperature of the beam stem base) 
CT oL 600=  (fixed temperature of the beam stem end) 
CT ogas 600=  (fixed temperature of the ambient) 
mC
Wk 9.51=  (thermal conductivity of A36 steel) 
mL 22.1=  (length of the beam stem) 
md 60.0=  (depth of the beam stem cross-section) 
mb f 178.0=  (width of the beam stem cross-section) 
Cm
Wh 225=  (heat transfer coefficient for natural convection with turbulent gas) 
 
Using Equation 16, the temperature distribution across the length of the beam stem was 
derived (see Figure 116 below). Consider that the beam stem is divided across its length 
into four sections. It can be concluded that the quarter section at the end of the beam stem 
essentially has a uniform temperature distribution. Therefore, the temperature of the steel 
in the vicinity of the shear connection can be assumed to have a uniform temperature at 
any given time during fire exposure. Moreover, the temperature distribution drops 
sharply in the quarter section of the beam stem in contact with the column (heat sink).  
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Figure 116: Beam Stem Temperature Distribution Across the Length 
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10.1.3 Estimation of the Post-Flashover Gas Temperature 
In 1981, Vytenis Babrauskas published an approximate calculation method for 
determining the peak, post-flashover gas temperature in a compartment containing a 
single opening. Equation 17 contains five efficiency factors based upon the specific 
characteristics of the fire situation. This calculation method was used to estimate the post-
flashover gas temperature within a compartment of WTC 5. 
 
54321)1725( θθθθθ∞∞ −+= TTT f   (17) 
 
Stoichiometric Factor ( )1θ  
The model compartment used in CFAST has five horizontal flow vents that are 1m. wide 
by 3 m. tall. These five vents will be consolidated into a single vent to match the 
requirements of this calculation method. Therefore, the following boundary conditions 
apply: 
 
215mA =  (area of consolidated ventilation opening) 
mh 3=  (height of ventilation opening) 
 
The maximum fuel flow rate was derived for the medium growing design fire as follows: 
 
s
kg
m f 87.0
.
=  (maximum fuel flow rate) 
 
It shall be assumed that the fuel is 100% cellulose. Therefore, the chemical equation may 
be represented as follows: 
 
( ) 2222281612 16.6012876.316 NCOHNOOHC ++→++  
 
Based upon the chemical equation shown above, the stoichiometric ratio r = 4.7. 
Therefore, the equivalence ratio may be calculated as follows: 
 
315.0
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hA
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φ  
 
Since the equivalence ratio is less then unity, the stoichiometric factor may be calculated 
as follows: 
 
422.0ln5.00.11 =+= φθ  
 
Steady-State Wall Loss Factor ( )2θ  
The second efficiency factor accounts for heat losses from the wall and ceiling surfaces. 
According to the CFAST model, the following parameters apply: 
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2206mAw =  (total surface area of the walls/ceiling) 
mL 016.0=  (wall thickness) 
mC
Wk 17.0=  (thermal conductivity of gypsum wallboard) 
 
Using these parameters, the steady-state wall loss factor may be derived as follows: 
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Transient Wall Loss Factor ( )3θ  
Since a steady-state solution is sought, the following value for the transient wall loss 
factor applies: 
 
0.13 =θ  
 
Opening (Vent) Height Factor ( )4θ  
This fourth efficiency factor accounts for radiation losses from the vent opening and may 
be calculated as follows: 
 
853.0205.00.1 3.04 =−=
−hθ  
 
Combustion Efficiency Factor ( )5θ  
The fire compartment can be viewed as a well, but not perfectly stirred reactor. Thus, a 
certain “unmixedness” is present. A maximum combustion efficiency can be used to 
characterize the unmixedness as follows: 
 
9.0=pb  (conservative value for unmixedness) 
 
Therefore, the combustion efficiency factor may be derived as follows: 
 
( ) 947.0ln5.00.15 =+= pbθ  
 
The five efficiency factors may be used to calculate the peak post-flashover temperature 
as follows: 
 
CTTT of 600)1725( 54321 ≈−+= ∞∞ θθθθθ  
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10.2  Structural Analyses 
10.2.1 Beam Stem Web Rupture Analysis 
Figure 107 above is a schematic of the column-tree and floor girder assembly contained 
in WTC 5. This particular analysis shall focus on the W24X61 beam stem. As the 
W18X50 girder deflects during fire exposure, it is expected to create an axial tensile 
force on the beam stems. It is valuable to estimate the tensile force required to cause 
beam web shear failure as a function of the temperature of the steel.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 117: Recovered Beam Stem Sample from WTC 5 
 
Figure 117 above shows a recovered beam stem sample from WTC 5. It is observed that 
failure was due to web shear. Therefore, other connection failure modes such as gross 
shear rupture may be ruled out. It is known that the beam stems are composed of A36 
steel with yield and ultimate strengths of 36 and 58 ksi, respectively. Moreover, the 
W24X61 beam stems have a clear distance and web thickness of 1.03125 and 0.4375 
inches, respectively. The nominal bolt and bolt hole diameter is 7/8 and 15/16 inches, 
respectively. Figure 118 below is a schematic showing the two shear tabs connected to 
the beam stem. 
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Figure 118: Elevation View of the Beam Stem 
 
As shown in Figure 118 above, a tensile force is applied to the shear tabs. As a result, the 
high strength bolts each apply a bearing force on the weak (right) side of each bolt hole. 
As shown in Figure 119 below, this bearing force equals one-third of the tensile force 
applied to the shear tabs because there are three bolts contained at this connection. 
 
 
Figure 119: Schematic of the Bearing Force on the Bolt Hole in the Beam Web 
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The bearing capacity of the beam web is governed by Equation 18. Since the beam web 
has three bolts, the capacity is tripled (as represented in the expression). 
 
 
( ) ( ) uwbuwcn FtdFtLR 4.232.13 ≥=  (18) 
 
cL = web clear distance [in] 
wt = web thickness [in] 
bd = nominal bolt diameter [in] 
uF = ultimate strength of A36 steel [ksi] (function of temperature) 
 
It should be noted that Equation 18 does not contain any safety factors and is based upon 
LRFD design. Therefore, the smaller of the two values calculated represents the ultimate 
capacity of the beam web. If this capacity is surpassed, rupture would be imminent.  
 
The change in ultimate strength of the steel with temperature is known. It is also known 
that the thickness and clear distance of the beam stem web is 0.4375 inches and 1.03125 
inches, respectively. Moreover, the nominal bolt diameter is 7/8 inches. Therefore, the 
maximum tensile force that can be applied to the shear tabs before web tear-out failure 
occurs can be plotted as a function of the steel temperature (see Figure 120 below). 
Referring to Figure 120 below, “Criterion A” refers to the shear plan capacity of the 
beam web (left side Equation 18) and “Criterion B” refers to the bearing strength of the 
web (right side of Equation 18). It is observed that increasing the steel temperature from 
20 °C to 650 °C results in a 75% reduction in the connection’s ability to resist loading. 
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Figure 120: Maximum Tensile Force Versus Steel Temperature
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10.2.2 Analysis of the Shear Tabs 
It must be determined if shear tabs were on both sides of the beam stem web in WTC 5. 
This is a requisite to an accurately model of the shear connection assembly in ABAQUS. 
Figure 121 below is a photograph provided by NIST that presents forensic evidence that 
two shear plates were used at each connection. Since the clarity of this photograph is 
open to interpretation, a mock structural connection design must be used to confirm this 
fact.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 121: Photograph of the Shear Tab Connection (WTC 5) (NIST) 
 
 
Figure 122 below shows a schematic of the beam stems and floor girder assembly. A 
distributed design load of 3.2 kips per foot is applicable to the assembly. The shear force 
at the shear tab connection is determined to equal about 35 kips. It is known that the shear 
tabs are composed of A36 steel. The 1970 AISC Steel Manual was referenced for the 
mock connection design. Table I-A3 of the manual states that a double tab assembly that 
is ¼-in thick and has 7/8-in diameter bolt holes will provide about 54 kips of shear 
resistance. Thus, a single shear tab would only provide about 27 kips of shear resistance. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the two tabs were used at each shear connection in 
WTC 5. 
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Figure 122: Beam Stem and Floor Girder Schematic 
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10.2.3 Structural Analysis of the Floor Girder 
Figure 107 above is a schematic of the column-tree and floor girder assembly contained 
in WTC 5. This particular analysis shall focus on the W18X50 floor girder. The floor 
girders of WTC 5 had a 2-hour fire resistance rating. Design No. N715 of the 2004 UL 
Directory specifies that the spray-applied fire resistance must be 1-inch thick in order to 
achieve a 2-hour rating. A schematic of the floor girder is shown in Figure 123 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 123: Schematic of the Girder 
 
 
The 1970 New York City Building Code was referenced in order to derive design live 
loads for the girder. A summary of loads acting upon the girder are summarized below. It 
should be noted that loading factors were not used. 
 
Dead Loads 
4-inch lightweight concrete slab: psfDLslab 3.38=  
W18X50 girder: plfDLgirder 50=  
 
Live Loads (Table 1607.1 of IBC 2006) 
Office load: psfLLoffice 50=  
Partitions load: psfLL partitions 15=  
 
Since the tributary area of the girder is 2660 ft , the distributed load was calculated to be: 
 
ft
kw 2.3=  
 
It is known that the nominal maximum moment is defined by Equation 19: 
 
8
2wL
M n =     (19) 
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 By substituting the known values, the maximum moment was calculated to be: 
 
194=nM k*ft 
 
The girders of WTC 5 were composed of A36 steel. The material behavior of A36 steel is 
represented in Figure 124 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 124: Stress/Strain Curve for A36 Steel 
 
 
Three structural analyses were conducted for the girders of WTC 5: elastic, plastic yield, 
and plastic hinge. Figure 125 below summarizes the limit state of the steel for each of the 
three analyses conducted. For each of the structural analyses conducted, the minimum 
yield strength to maintain the limit state was derived. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 125: Summary of Limit States 
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Elastic Analysis 
The elastic analysis involves the determination of the minimum yield strength required so 
that the outer fibers of the girder remain at the elastic limit (see Figure 124 above). 
Equation 20 represents the minimum required yield strength: 
 
x
n
y
S
M
F =(min)  (20) 
 
39.88 inS x =  (section modulus (Table 1-1 of AISC Manual)) 
 
Therefore, the minimum required yield strength of the steel is as follows: 
 
ksiFy 26(min) =  
 
Section 10.1.1 reveals that the yield strength of the steel will decrease to 26 ksi once the 
following temperature has been reached: 
 
CT o380=  
 
 
Furthermore, Section 10.1.1 demonstrates that the steel girder with 1-inch insulation 
reaches a temperature of 380 °C after the following time of exposure to the ASTM E-119 
furnace test: 
0.1=t  hour 
 
Plastic Yield Analysis 
The plastic yield analysis involves the determination of the minimum yield strength 
required so that the outer fibers of the girder are plastic and the inner fibers remain 
elastic. Equation 21 represents the minimum required yield strength: 
 
x
n
y
Z
M
F =(min)  (21) 
 
3101inZ x =  (plastic modulus (Table 1-1 of AISC Manual)) 
 
Therefore, the minimum required steel strength is as follows: 
 
ksiFy 23(min) =  
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Section 10.1.1 reveals that the strength of the steel will decrease to 23 ksi once the 
following temperature has been reached: 
 
CT o450=  
 
Furthermore, Section 10.1.1 demonstrates that the steel girder with 1-inch insulation 
reaches a temperature of 450 °C after the following time of exposure to the ASTM E-119 
furnace test: 
2.1=t  hours 
 
Plastic Hinge Analysis 
The plastic hinge analysis involves the determination of the minimum yield strength 
required so that the entire cross-section of the girder becomes plastic. This is the point at 
which the girder is on the verge of rupture (excessive deflection), as defined by the 
standards of the ASTM E-119 test.  
 
The nominal moment calculated above does not apply to this analysis. The method of 
virtual work was utilized in order to derive an expression for the fully-plastic moment. 
Figure 126 below provides a schematic of a plastic hinge formation. 
 
 
 
Figure 126: Schematic for Plastic Moment Derivation 
 
The generalized virtual work equation is as follows: 
 
ernalexternal WW int=  
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In general terms, the external work required to cause a given deformation equals the 
internal work required to cause a given stress in the material. This general equation above 
may be rewritten as follows (Equation 22): 
 
∑∑ = jpii MP θδ  (22) 
 
According to Figure 126 above, the following is true: 
 
( ) ( ) θδδθ tan2
2
tan L
L
=⇒=  
 
For small deformation: θθ ≈tan  
 
( )θδ
2
L=  
 
Therefore, the virtual work equation may be represented as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )θθ 2
2 p
MLwL =  
 
The plastic moment can be solved for as follows: 
 
4
2wL
M p =  
 
If the given parameters are substituted into the expression above, the moment required to 
cause a plastic hinge to form can be derived as follows: 
 
ftkM p *387=  
 
The ratio of pM  to nM  equals 2. More precisely, the shape factor equals 2; the girder 
has two times the reserve strength available. Therefore, the minimum steel strength 
required for this case is half of that calculated in the plastic yield analysis above. 
 
ksi
ksi
F hingey 11
2
23
)( ≈=  
 
Section 10.1.1 reveals that the strength of the steel will decrease to 11 ksi once the 
following temperature has been reached: 
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CT o640=  
 
Furthermore, Section 10.1.1 demonstrates that the steel girder with 1-inch insulation 
reaches a temperature of 640 °C after the following time of exposure to the ASTM E-119 
furnace test: 
 
9.1=t  hours 
 
 
This calculated time makes practical sense because the girder is 2-hour rated, as defined 
by the standards of the ASTM E-119 test. Moreover, the girder would resist failure for 
longer than 1.9 hours under experimental conditions because of strain hardening of the 
steel. 
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10.3  Finite Element Modeling 
10.3.1 Overview of the Finite Element Analysis Method 
The finite element method originated from the need for solving complex structural 
problems in civil and aeronautical engineering. In 1678, Robert Hooke established the 
basis for modern finite element stress analysis as Hooke’s Law, which states that an 
elastic body stretches (strain) in proportion to the force (stress) on it. Development of the 
finite element method can be traced back to the work by A. Hrennikoff and R. Courant in 
the early 1940s and this method has been continually developed and improved since then 
(Bower). 
 
Although the finite element method is a complex mathematical technique, the 
fundamental principles are relatively straightforward. The finite element method works 
by breaking a real object down into a large number of elements (e.g., 100,000 cubes). The 
behavior of each little element, which is simple in shape, is readily predicted by a set of 
mathematical equations. The summation of the behavior of each individual element 
produces the expected behavior of the actual object, which often has complex geometry 
(Bower).  
 
As a typical example, consider a body in which the distribution of an unknown variable 
(e.g., temperature, displacement, etc.) is sought. The first step of any finite element 
analysis is to divide the actual geometry of the structure using a collection of discrete 
portions called finite elements. These elements are joined together by shared nodes. The 
collection of nodes and finite elements is known as the mesh (see Figure 127 below). 
After the problem has been divided into the discrete elements, the governing equations 
for each element are calculated and then assembled to yield a system of equations that 
describe the behavior of the body as a whole. In a stress analysis problem, the 
displacements of the nodes would be calculated, and from this information, the stresses 
and strains in the elements can be determined.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 127: Example of a Finite Element Mesh 
 
Prior to the development of finite element computer software, engineers employed 
integral and differential calculus techniques to solve these types of problems. Presently, 
the finite element method is commonly known as a computer technique for solving 
partial differential equations by partitioning a solid body into discrete regions. These 
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computer programs are used to predict the deformation and stress fields within solid 
bodies subjected to external forces. Additionally, most finite element software can be 
used to solve problems involving fluid flow, heat transfer, electromagnetic fields, 
diffusion, and many other phenomena (Bower).  
 
For this project, the computer software ABAQUS is used for performing finite element 
analyses. ABAQUS consists of three core programs: ABAQUS/Standard, 
ABAQUS/Explicit and ABAQUS/CAE. ABAQUS/Standard can be used to solve 
traditional implicit finite element problems (e.g., static and thermal) with a wide range of 
contact and nonlinear material options. ABAQUS/CAE is a graphical user interface that 
supports both ABAQUS/Standard and ABAQUS/Explicit. ABAQUS/CAE allows the 
user to create, edit, monitor, diagnose, and visualize the problem. Moreover, 
ABAQUS/CAE integrates modeling, analysis, job management, and results visualization 
in a unified environment. 
 
ABAQUS/Explicit was not used during this project because it focuses on transient 
dynamics and quasi-static analyses. This explicit approach is appropriate for applications 
such as manufacturing processes. In general, ABAQUS is known for its high 
performance and ability to solve a multitude of highly-nonlinear engineering problems. 
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10.3.2 Utilization of Advanced ABAQUS Features 
In order to accurately model the structural bay system of WTC 5, as well as simulate the 
thermal conditions to which it was exposed, certain key features of ABAQUS were 
utilized. These advanced features are described in this section. 
 
Contact Interactions 
In ABAQUS, mere proximity of two bodies is not sufficient to model their contact with 
each other. Contact may be defined in terms of two surfaces that may interact with each 
other as a “contact pair.” ABAQUS enforces contact conditions by forming equations 
involving groups of nearby nodes from the respective surfaces. Conditional constraints at 
various locations on each surface are applied to simulate contact conditions; the locations 
and conditions of these constraints depend on the contact discretization used in the 
overall contact formulation. ABAQUS offers two contact discretization options: a 
traditional “node-to-surface” and a “surface-to-surface.” 
 
With traditional node-to-surface discretization, the contact conditions are established 
such that each “slave” node on one side of a contact interface effectively interacts with a 
point of projection on the “master” surface on the opposite side of the contact interface. 
The slave nodes are constrained not to penetrate into the master surface; however, the 
nodes of the master surface are allowed to penetrate into the slave surface. The contact 
direction is based in the normal of the master surface. 
 
ABAQUS also offers a “small-sliding” option which creates an invisible boundary 
between surfaces that are parallel to each other. This option prevents contact “chattering” 
in which nodes from the slave surface “fall” past the master surface. This option was used 
for the contact defined between the shear tabs and the steel members since translation in 
the vicinity of the bolt holes tends to cause contact “chattering” to occur. 
 
When surfaces are in contact they usually transmit shear, as well as normal forces, across 
their interface. There is a relationship between these two-force components commonly 
referred to as friction. By default, ABAQUS assumes that the interaction between 
contacting bodies is frictionless. Friction may be included in the model if a contact 
property definition is established. Experimental data show that the friction coefficient that 
opposes the initiation of slipping is different from the friction coefficient that opposes 
established slipping. The former is referred to as the “static” friction coefficient, and the 
latter is referred to as the “kinetic” friction coefficient. The static friction coefficient is 
typically higher than the kinetic friction coefficient. These friction coefficients may be 
defined in ABAQUS and assigned to particular contact pairs of a given model assembly. 
 
In the WTC 5 model, friction was defined for all surfaces in contact. In addition to 
mechanical contact, thermal contact is defined in the WTC 5 model. At interfaces such as 
that of the spray-applied insulation and the beams, thermal contact is defined to simulate 
the conduction heat transfer that occurs between the two bodies. The thermal contact 
between the beams and the concrete slab is particularly important because the concrete 
acts as an effective heat sink. 
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Heat Transfer Phenomena 
ABAQUS has the capability to simulate conduction, convection, and radiation. 
Conduction is simulated by specifying the thermal conductivity of the materials that 
compose a given model. Heat transfer due to convection is modeled by creating surface 
film condition interactions at specific surfaces of a given model. Film condition 
interactions define heating or cooling due to convection by surrounding fluids. In this 
case, the convection heat transfer coefficient, as well as the sink temperature, must be 
specified. Radiation interactions may be utilized in a model to simulate the heat transfer 
to a nonreflecting environment due to radiation. In this case, the Stephen-Boltzmann 
constant must be specified. 
 
In the WTC 5 model, all three modes of heat transfer are simulated. The upper layer gas 
from the fire interacts with the spray-applied insulation of the structural components via 
natural convection. Since the temperature of the compartment changes with time, the sink 
temperature varies over the duration of the simulation. Heat that is transferred to the 
insulation via convection is conducted through the insulation and to the steel via 
conduction through the insulation, as well as across the contact interface. Since the 
structural assembly reaches elevated temperatures during the simulation, it will radiate to 
the surroundings. This heat transfer process is inherently transient since the gas 
temperature is a function of time.  
 
 
Nonlinear Temperature-Dependent Material Strength Properties 
Most materials of engineering interest initially respond elastically to external forces. 
Elastic behavior means that the deformation is fully recoverable: when the load is 
removed, the material returns to its original shape. If the load exceeds the material’s yield 
point, the deformation is no longer recoverable. Once the yield point of steel has been 
exceeded, it will permanently deform and begin to gain strength due to strain hardening. 
Strain hardening describes the phenomenon of the crystalline realignment at the atomic 
level of the steel material that occurs under high strains. It is apparent that once the yield 
strength of steel has been exceeded, the strength properties become highly nonlinear. 
 
Stress-strain data representing the nonlinear steel strength properties can be inputted in 
ABAQUS. Plastic true stress and strain values, not total stress and strain, are used in 
defining hardening behavior. Furthermore, the first data pair must correspond with the 
onset of plasticity (the plastic value must be zero in the first pair). For the WTC 5 model, 
test data was referenced and inputted into ABAQUS to represent the nonlinear strength 
behavior of A36 steel. Furthermore, the data that is used for the model is temperature-
dependent. 
 
 
Sequentially-Coupled Thermal-Stress Analysis Method 
A sequentially-coupled thermal-stress analysis is used when the stress/deformation field 
in a structure depends on the temperature field in that structure, but the temperature field 
can be found without knowledge of the stress/deformation response. A typical analysis of 
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this type consists of two ABAQUS runs: a heat transfer analysis and a subsequent stress 
analysis.  
 
After a thermal analysis has been run, nodal temperatures can be stored as a function of 
time in the results file or output database. The nodal temperatures are then read into the 
stress analysis as a predefined field; the temperature varies with position and is usually 
time dependent. The field is predefined because it is not changed by the stress analysis 
solution. Predefined fields are always read at nodes and are then interpolated to the 
calculation points within elements as needed. This analysis method is utilized for the 
WTC 5 model because the structural response is highly dependent upon the steel 
temperature history, but there is not inverse dependency. 
 
 
Geometric Large Deflection Theory 
When a body undergoes large deflections, nonlinear effects result. Large deflection may 
result in geometric or boundary nonlinearity. Geometric nonlinearity can be attributed to 
the change in direction of a force resultant as the body deflects. For instance, a cantilever 
beam that is level will have a force resultant due to gravity loads which is vertical. 
Alternatively, a cantilever beam that has deflected significantly will have a force resultant 
due to gravity loads which is diagonal. Boundary nonlinearity occurs when a body was 
deflected so much that it contacts another body. 
 
ABAQUS allows the user to specify whether geometric nonlinearity is accounted for in a 
given model. Use of the geometric nonlinearity option increases the computational cost, 
but results in a more accurate simulation. In the case of the WTC 5 model, accounting for 
geometric nonlinearity is important because it is expected that the beams deflected 
significantly under high thermal loading. 
 
 
Tie Constraints 
A surface-based tie constraint ties two surfaces together for the duration of a simulation. 
This type of constraint can be used to make the translational and rotational motion equal 
for a pair of surfaces. One surface is designated to be the slave surface, and the other 
surface is the master surface. In addition to modeling connected parts of an assembly, tie 
constraints are useful for mesh refinement purposes because they allow for rapid 
transitions in mesh density within a given model. 
 
In the WTC 5 model, tie constraints are prevalently used. Simple connections away from 
the shear connection of interest are modeled using tie constraints: the beam section web is 
fused to the girder web in the thermal model. Moment connections are also modeled 
using tie constraints: the beam stem web and flange sections are fused to the flange of the 
column. Lastly, tie constraints are used to allow for rapid mesh density transitions in the 
vicinity of the shear connection of interest. If tie constraints are not used for these rapid 
transitions, a high degree of mesh distortion would occur, which could lead to model 
divergence or inaccurate results.  
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Symmetry Boundary Conditions 
Symmetry boundary conditions are used to perform a mirrored analysis. It is 
computationally less expensive to model a small section of a symmetric body, as opposed 
to explicitly modeling its entirety. Moreover, symmetry boundary conditions can be 
applied to a symmetric portion of the body in order to simulate the behavior of its 
entirety.  
 
In the case of the WTC 5 model, behavior of a 4-bay structural system is sought (the 
region of initial collapse solely due to fire on the 8th floor). Only 1/8 of this structural 
assembly is modeled explicitly in ABAQUS. Symmetry boundary conditions are applied 
to the outer edges of this section in order to derive behavior of the entire 4-bay assembly. 
For instance, a floor girder is only modeled up to its mid-span. A symmetry boundary 
condition about the x-y plane is applied at the mid-span in order to derive the behavior of 
the entire span of the girder.  
 
 
Bolt Pretension 
The bolts in WTC 5 were installed with a specified pretension. Bolts loads are used to 
model the tightening forces in the bolts. The tension in the tightened bolts is modeled by 
applying a concentrated force across a user-defined pretension section of each bolt in the 
first step of the mechanical analysis. This force is self-equilibrating and acts in the 
direction normal to the pretension section of each bolt. In later steps, further length 
changes of the bolt is prevented to ensure that the bolts act as standard, deformable 
components which respond to externally-applied loadings. Otherwise, the force in the 
fastener will remain constant.  
 
 
Automatic Stabilization of Rigid Body Motions in Contact Problems 
Since the WTC 5 mechanical model is a “quasi-dynamic” analysis, stabilization 
capabilities of the software were used. Since the shank diameter of the bolts is smaller 
than the diameter of the bolt holes, the bolts are free to undergo rigid body motions prior 
to stable contact being established. This rigid body motion early in the analysis often 
leads to model divergence. To account for this initial rigid body motion, the software 
offers automatic control of rigid body motions prior to contact closure. This capability is 
specified for the contact step of the model. 
 
The stabilization feature is meant to be used in cases in which it is clear that contact will 
be established, but the exact positioning of multiple bodies is difficult to predict. This is 
especially true for the configuration of the shear tab of the WTC 5 model. When this 
feature is used, the software activates viscous damping for relative motions of the contact 
pair at all slave nodes. During the step in which stabilization is activated, the applied 
loading should be restricted to that necessary to establish contact. In the case of the WTC 
5 model, only 1% of the pretension force was activated; the remaining parts of the model 
were restrained.  
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By default, the damping coefficient is calculated automatically at each slave node based 
on the stiffness of the underlying elements and the step time. The damping coefficient is 
applied to all contact pairs equally in the normal and tangential directions and then is 
ramped down linearly over the step. It should be noted that the stabilization feature is 
only active when the distance between the contact surfaces is smaller than a characteristic 
surface dimension. Thus, this feature applies itself well to the bolt-hole gaps in the WTC 
5 model. The use of stabilization via viscous damping does not affect the solution of the 
model, for the damping vanishes completely at the end of the contact step. 
 
 
Restart Analysis 
The WTC 5 mechanical and thermal models both contain numerous analysis steps. The 
initial steps of each model (the mechanical contact and pretension steps especially) can 
take an extended amount of time to complete. During the long troubleshooting phases of 
each model, changes to later steps were made and then needed to be tested. In order to 
analyze these changes efficiently, the restart analysis capability of the software was 
utilized. 
 
When an analysis is run, the software can write “memory” files upon request. These files, 
collectively referred to as the restart files, allow an analysis to be completed up to a 
certain point in a particular run and then restarted and continued in a subsequent run. The 
user may control the amount of data written to the restart files by specifying a particular 
frequency at which the data is written to file. Restart files can be very large if the user 
does not control this frequency. For the WTC models, only one increment per step was 
retained for later reference, thus minimizing the size of the files.  
 
The user may restart (continue) an analysis by specifying that the restart or state, analysis 
database, and part files created by the original analysis be read into the new analysis. 
Moreover, the user specifies the point (step, increment, and iteration) in the previous 
analysis from which to restart. The use of restart analysis was particularly useful for 
troubleshooting the loading step of the model. In this case, the contact and pretension 
steps were not required to run every time, but rather the load step alone.  
 
 
